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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years a great, new scientific interest in human
nature has developed.

Formerly our best scholars and intellec-

tuals were devoted to studies which would provide men with greater
material and cultural advantages, while man himself remained an
unsearched mystery.
est,

whi~h

But in the last fifty years this new inter-

in large part has been caused by the world-wide inse-

curity and unrest of our age, has made considerable progress in
stUdies of man himself.

There is genuine interest in the search

for a more profound insight into our nature.
A corresponding interest in the nature of man has arisen in
the realm of pllilosophy.

Existentia+ist philosophy clearly exem-

plifies this intense new personal

app~oach

to man.

The present

thesis may be conceived of as an attempt to catch a glimpse of
this philosophical movement by studying the system of a modern
~hilosopher

who had a share in its development.

No further explanation, then, seems necessary for undertaking
the study of a philosopher of person.

The purpose of the thesis

is to examine and express the philosophy of Louis Lavelle from the
~articular
~mphasi8

aspect of his theory of person and personality.

Special

will be given to the notion of human freedom which is
1

2

central in his philosophy of person.

The treatment of Lavelle's

philosophy will be from the aspect of its historical and doctrinal
contexts, and will include a description of his fundamental
themes.

The second part of the thesis will emphasize the primary

importance of freedom in Lavelle's philosophy of person.

\Yhile

Lavelle never undertook to explain his philosophy in this way, it
is hoped that the results are something that would be acceptable
to him.
The bibliography comprises only the major books and articles
written by or about Lavelle in

p~ench

and English (with two excep-

tions) which were available to the author.

An

exhaustive biblio-

graphy on Lavelle (which includes everything written by or about
him up to mld-1957) has been published by Jean Ecole in his book
on Lavelle's metaphysics. l
Before beginning our study, it *111 be of interest tQ learn

.

something of the background, life, and characteristics of the
philosopher whose system we are to study.

Lavelle liked to recall

with a smile the complaint of Charles Peguy that it is characteristic of Parisians "not to have a country" (n'avoir E!! de

~).

IJean Ecole, ~ Metaphysigue ~ l'etre ~ ~ philosophie
Louis Lavelle (Phllosophes Contemporains), Editions Nauwelaerts,
Paris, 1957, pp. 259-93. Partial bIbliographies are also to be
found in the following places: Giornale £! Metafisica, VII (4)
(Luglio-Agosto 1952), pp. 403-404; Les !tudes PhilosoEIligues, VI
(Avril-Septembre 19$1), pp. l34-l37;-rrevue Tnomiste, II (1952),
Pp. 157-159; and Beohara Sargi, La Participation i l'etre dans la
~hIlosophle de Louis Lavelle (Paris, 1957), pp. Ib3-l66. -----~

3
The oount17 which Lavelle so loved was situated near Box-deaux in
the extreme oonfines of Dordogne in P4rigard, France.

Born an

July 1$, 1883 at St. Martin de Villareal, Lavelle spent all his
early years in near-by Parranquet.

H. owned his family home 1n

later year. and spent as much time there as possible.

As if

destinl marked this preference, 1 t was there he died after five

.

surfocating hours on the night at August, 31, 19$1.

2

Atter studies at L,ana undep Hamelin, Lavelle received his
Agresa de phl1osophie in 1909 and his Dooteur-es-Lettrea in 1922
from the Unlveraity at Stra.bourg.

During the First World War,

which Interl"Upted his atudi•• , Lavelle was a prisonep of the
Germans.

When the war ended he served as a professor in several

lyc8es at Condorcet.

Pram 1932 to 1934 he taught a course in

general philosoPhy at the Borbanne.

Following this he lectured

with great success at the Unlv.rai t7 :,of Bordeaux untIl, In 1940,
he was made Inspector General at PublIc EducatIon.

In December

of 1941 he auoceeded LeRoy and Bergson In the highly prized
~rofessorship

at the Collage de France.

During his entire philo-

lIoph1oal oareer and right up until his death, Lavelle wrote many

2. ene I.e Senne, "Louis, LaVelle,· Glomale !!.M,tati8ica, VII

(4) (Lu S11o-AgOlto 19.$2),

401.

fh1a memor1al article b7 Lavelle'.

~lo8e triend and associate has manJ interest1ngdeta1ls and
~n.ights into' Lavelle's lite and philosoph,.
See allo Georges

PaVI,

-Lou1. Lav,lle," Lea Stude. ftt10sgph1guea, XII (h) (Octobre.
Pec_bra 19.$1), 319-.326, and Xt!I
(janVier-lars 19S8), IS-31,
itOI' biographical detaIls of Lavelle fa 11te and a sketch of hia
!Who 1. 17. taD and works.

4
books and articles, and he contributed to numerous conferences in
Cologne, Brussels, and the School for Higher Studies at Ghent.

In

all of his writings, perhaps most notably in La philosophie franx9.ise antre

~

deux guerres (Paris, 1942) and Traite des valeurs,

I (Paris, 1951), Lavelle shows a penetrating knowledge of the
systems of both modern and classical philosophers.
In his years of study and teaching, Lavelle developed a
profound philosophy, both personal and traditional, not by consciously reacting against the tendencios of his own age, but seeming to ignore them, by pursuing his own road.

Vincent Smith has

characterized him as "[o]ne of the greatest metaphysicians of our
day • • • [whoJ has driven deeply enough into the real to find a
point of intersection for whatever is positive and salutary in
modern philosophy."3
An interesting result followed tram Lavelle's tendenQY to
independent thought.

In 1921 he presented his doctoral theses

on La dialectigue du monde sensible and L! perception visuelle de
~

profondeur before an academic jury of the University of Stras-

bourg.

In spite of a brilliant defense, the reception he received

was plainly reserved, and to the general surprise of his fellow
students, he received only the note "good" and was awarded the
equivalent of a

~

for his work.

Perhaps he made the mistake of

3Vincent Edward Smith, Idea-Men

p.

345.

2!

Today (Milwaukee, 1950),

5
affirming the originality of his thought in too forceful a manner,
failing to have sufficient recourse to the masters of recognized
authority.

At any rate, because of this, he never occupied a

Chair of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, since these are held only by
those whose doctoral theses merit the equivalent of an A.
Lavelle had an extremely dignified personality.

He seemed

even a little majestic as he slowly moved his big body (which
expanded a bit towards the end of his life).
grave and very correct, his speech slow and

His words were
care~~l.

When he

spoke, his right arm kept time with the cadonce of his words.4
The clarity and precision of Lavelle's expression was especially
remarkable.

His limpid style, appearing to flow from a spring

which was never either turbid or dry, was a conquest rather than
a gift.

His thought was the expression of a personality which,

although reserved, was always ready to give itself. 5

Some have
•

"

even considered his engaging style worthy of caution lest the
reader, caught off guard, be fascinated by harmonious, fluid,

4Information from a letter of December 9, 1957 to the author
from Pare Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., Professor of Philosophy at
College Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium. (Translation mine.)
F'or further interesting personal details about Lavelle, see
Diogene, t'Louis Lavelle, Uomini lett!," Giornale di Metafisica,
XII (6) (Novembre-Decembre 1957), 7 3 5 - 7 5 2 . - 5Jean Lacroix, "Un philosophe du consentement," [Louis
Lavelle], Lumiere et Vie, VII (1952), 105-121. Translation frOM
Dom. Illtyd Trethowan~A Philosopher of Acceptance: Louis
Lavelle," Downside Review, LXXI (1953), [372-386J, J73. This
article will afterwards be referred to as "Lacroix. I

6
and somewhat exaggerated expressions which please the ear but
render him a bit uncritical. 6
With all of Lavelle's winning qualities, we must acknowledge
the fact that he has not been too widely known outside of France.
How can this be explained?

Pere Troisfontaines atte!l1pts an

answer to this question when, after referring to the "luminous
synthesis" of T.Javelle's philosophy, he writes:

"But • • • the

search for an absolute point of view, almost from outside concrete experience, Is directly against the grain of the contemporary trend in modern philosophy.

This, I think, explains the

little influence exorcised by Lavelle on Prench thouCht (whatever
may be, in other respects, his intrinsic value).

The atheists

and materialists do not care for his persona.list spiritualism;
the Christians find him a bit too 'traditional,' a bit too
crystalized, too 'classical,."7
Lavelle was not a Catholic; he was Protestant by birth but
was detached from any practice.

However he considered himself a

Christian and refers frequently to the importance of Christianity

6 N• J. J. Balthasar, "L'univocite non immanente de l'etre
totale," Giornale di Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952),
447. See also IreMe Chevalier, O.P., "AperQu sur la philosophie
de ~t. Lavelle, If Revue Thomi ste, XLV (Juillet-Septembre 1939), 509533. Chevalier also quotes from M. Leroux's article in the Bulle~ de la Societe franzaise (Juillet-Septembre 1936), p. 176, to
the same effect.
7Inforrnation from a letter of December 9, 1957 to the aut'lor
from Pere Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., Professor of Philosophy at
College Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium. ('rranslation mine.)

7
on hls thoueht (without which he would have devolved into a sort
of pantheism.)R

Indeed, his inseparable friend, Rone Le Senne,

remarks that by recalling the continuous, actual, vivifying daily
presence of God in our experience (through his univocal concept
uf being), Lavelle manifests a "Catholic sensibility.,,9
The content of Lavelle's philosophy we will see more clearly
in our discussion of his basic philosophical themes in Chapter 3.
We may oonclude this introductory ohapter by quoting from the
Inaugural Leoture which Lavelle delivered at the
when he assumed the Chair of Philosophy.

Coll~ge

de France

He gave apt and memorabl

expression to his own philosophical ideals when he said:

"To seek

the absolute in oneself and not outside oneself, in the most
intimate, profound, and personal experience, but an absolute in
which we can only participate, which establishes our very existenoe in an ever-renewed oommunicationwith all beings by the
interMediation of all things; • • • such are the demands of Prench
thought to which we intend to remain loyal.

It is not in avoid-

ing: contact with the absolute, but in trying to rediscover it in
all the events of our lives that we shall give them their true
signific ance t and this will make us cap1:ible of appreci:-l ting the
weight of our burden and of accepting it. 1110

8~.
9Le Senne, p. 421.
10Lacroix, pp. 372-373.

CHAPTER

II

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF LAVELLE'S PHILOSOPHY
In seeking to understand the philosophy of Louis Lavelle, it
will be profitable to consider what currents or streams of
thought, common in the histories of philosophy, best describe the
place he occupies in the modern philosophical world.
The whole of the contemporary philosophical world has been
viewed as a product of the three schools of existentialism, Marxism, and personalism.

1

But a still closer perspective of

Lavelle's thought can be obtained by considering him in the light
of existentialism, philosophy of spirit, and personalism.

Each of

these requires a brief description; their full pertinence, however, will be seen in the following chapter when the main doctrinal points of Lavelle's philosophy ar~ discussed.

•

Existentialism
According to existentialism, the principal problem of philosophy is that of our concrete existence.
is our purpose or goal?

Why do we exist?

What

More simply, what does it mean for us to

lSee Jean-Marie Grevillot, Les grands courants de la pensee
contemporaine (Paris, 1947).
8

9
exist?2

In its emphasis on this aspect of reality, existentialism

is a reaction of the philosophy of man against the excesses and
imperaonalism of philosophies of reason, ideas, and things. 3

The

approach to reality by reason alone is through discursive and

~istorical, systematic methods. It For the existentialist, this
approach is inadequate since it does not explain and elucidate
the more intimate aspects of our existence which, though less
tangible, are no less real.
The initiator of modern existentialism is the Danish

S~ren

Kierkegaard, who lived in the first half of the last century.

He

viewed every individual as an original, unique being who is
isolated from the guidance of universal principles and who is
unaided by thought and speculation, which are on a different level
from individuality.

In his conscious opposition to Hegelian

rationalism, Kierkegaard strove to see the supreme reality of the
universe in indiViduals.

Existentiali'sm today is essentially the

same, though it has developed and been variously modified.
In the

care~llly

chosen words of Pere Jolivet, existentialism

2 Ibid., p. 13.

3Emmanuel Mounier, Esprit, Avril, 1946. (Cited in Grevillot,
p. 13.) ('rranslation mine.) A footnote on page 14 of Grevillot
gives Mounier's division of existentialism into twelve principal
themes.
4Vincent Edward Smith, Idea-Men
pp. 248-249.

2!

Todaz (Milwaukee, 1950),

10

is "the collection of doctrines according to which philosophy has
for its object the analysis and description of concrete existence,
considered as an act of liberty which is constituted by selfaffirmation and which has no other origin or foundation than this
affirmation of self."5

Lavelle himself described existentialism

as a system which implies that each of us is a being who is cast
alone in tho world with his own personal abilities which he must
discover and actualize. 6
In his Court traite de l'exiatence, Jacques flaritain distin£"uishes two fundamental forms of existentialism.

'rhe one, he

says, "affirms the primacy of exIstence, but as implying and
preserving essences or natures, and as manifesting the supreme
victory of the intellect and intelligibility."

This he considers

authentic existentialism, the existentialism of St. filomas.

The

other "affirms the primacy of existe:Q.ce, but as destroying or
abolishing essences or natures and as 'nlanifesting the supreme
defeat of the intellect and of intelligibility."7

5Regis Jolivet, Les doctrines existentialistes (Abbate Saint',Vandrille, 1948), p. 247 "l'enaemble des doctrines d'apres
lesquelles la philosophie a pour objet l'analyse et 180 description
de l'exlstence concr~te, consideree comme l'acte d'une liberte qui
se constltue en staffirmant et nta d'autre genese ou d'autre
fondament que cette affirmation de sol." (Translation mine.)
6Louls Lavelle, Introduction
p.

36.

a l'ontolo8ie

(Paris, 1947),

7Jacques Marltain, Court traite ~ 1 'existence (Paris, 1947),
p. 13. (English version cited is from translation: Existence and
the Existent by Louis Galantiere and Gerald B. Phalen (!~ew York;-I"91"i8) , p. j.]

11

Viewed in another way, existentialism can be seen to havo
two distinct currents.

TI~re

is the atheistic, nihilistic strain,

to which philosophers like J. -p. Sartre and
bolong.

r~artin

lieideer-er

They view man as surrounded by nothingnes8, standinG in

hn;,,:uish ar,ains t pure ot'1erness; and since thc::-e is only not:lingness to clarify life, they despair of all nearlinp; and value.
t~elstic

"!'he

current in existentialism, however, visible in Karl

Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel among others, taJces a posl tive outlook
and emphasizes mants openness to tho '£ranscencient in nature.
'rhese philosophers take a dynamic view of existence, considering
it the means by which man realizes himself.

'rhe "Philosophy of

Action" of Maurice Blondel is a clear example of this.

This

positive and open approach to reality can be reGarded partly as
a reaction against positivism and partly as a reaction against
the reduction of relision to social morality.

It asserts the
•
Transcendent after a reconsideration of personal experience and
its i:rnplications. 8
Lavelle, who is certainly in the existentialist movement,
is also well \vithin its theistic current.

According to his

philosophy I can discover and realize myself only in association
with God, whom Sartre donies, and without whom, according to

8Fredr1ck Copleston, S.J., Contemporary Philosophy (London,

19.5 6), p. 109.

12
Lavelle, I would be nothing. 9

The third chapter will more

fully explain Lavelle's concept of being, and discuss the all-important place he gives to participation.
Existentialism, however, when viewed in its tota.l context,
i3 a philosophy that affirMS the primacy, or priority, of existence; and this priority is affirmed in relation to the traditional
Platonic emphasis on essence.

The philosophy of Louis Lavelle has

been viewed as a neat synthesis of these two possibilities.

For

him, as for the existentia.lists, existence in man precedes
essence; but--and in this he agrees with the essentialists--it is
his essence, or what he is, and not his existence, or the fact of
being, that constitutes the value of man.10
Thus it is that many authors agree in creating a new division
of existentialism for Lavelle's philosophy; they consider his
philosophy an "essentialist

existent~alism.1I

In his work Het

spiri tualis tisch l!:xistentlalisme !.!!! Louis Lavelle, M. Delfgaauw
notes that Lavelle has joined a metaphysical tradition which
defines the relation of existence and essence.

He cites a letter

in which Lavelle states that existonce is given to us precisely
so that we can acquire an essence and come to know our individual

9 Jean Ecole, "L' exis -tentialisme de Louis Lavelle, If Revue
rhomiste, LII (2) (1952), 390. (Translation mine.)
10paul Foulquie, Existentialism (London, 1948), p. 12. ['This
English translation was made from the first F'rench edi tion by
Kathleen Raine.]

13
eXIstence. 1l

Lavelle adds that he has never rejected t.he notion

of an ideal essence, but

considers it a mediatrix between
pure being and individual eXistence. 12
Philosonhy of

rat~er

SRiri~

In the past twenty-five years there has arisen in France a
peculiar philosophy under the name of Philosophy of Spirit.

In-

terest in the realm of the spirit, of course, is not new in
France, nor new in this century.

It can, in fact, be easily

traced in }f'rench philosophers back through Maine de Biran and
Descartes.

Vincent Smith sees an even more ancient source when

he writes that the Socratic spirit and even the Socratic method
has, to a certain extent, been renewed today by the group in
France promoting the philosophy of spirit. 13

Three main prin-

ciples characterize this movement:

a return to the absolute; a
•
consideration of all human experienco;and a consideration of all
the spiritual tendencies which require the comprehension of the
hQ~an person. 1
The three most influential figures in the

4

11 M• Delfgaauw, ~ spiritualistisch existentialisme ~
Louis Lavelle (Amsterdam, 19r~7), p. 125. This is quoted in
Jolivetts ~ doctrines existentialistes in a footnote on page

21.

l2~.

13Smith, p. 333. See also ~ile Brahier, TransformatiJn de
la philosophie franiaise (Paris, 1950), Chapltre XVI: "Permanence
dU aplritualisme, It pp. 207-219.
141. M. Bochenski, La phi1osophie contemporains en europe,
(Paris, 1951), p. 178. (Traduit par Fran~ois Vaudou.r-

movement of the philosophy of spirit which continues the Vr'el1.ch
traditions of spiritualism that Bergson eMbraced, are GabrIel
Marcel, Rene Le Senne, and Louis Lavelle .15
doctrines a "spiritual existentialism."

One might call their

According to Lavelle,

there is no metaphysics of the objective; metaphysics ought to
be rather the science of spiritual intimacy.

He finds the idea

of being in this intimacy, and will show by a kind of ontological
argument that this idea contains a reality.16
As Lavelle himself has written, the philosophy of spirit has
marked in Franoe an effort of resistance against all the doctrines
which oultivate anguish and despair in the soul, instead of trying
to surmount them; doctrines w:hich regard !lothlngness (neant)
more profound thxn beinv (etre).

fLj

The nihilist philonophers

remain satisfied wi th a sentiment of' our subjection to the body;
and instead of trying to free us from it, they cause us tQ labor
to engage ourselves in the temporal servitudes from which it was
the ~oal of ancient wisdom to free us. 17 The philosophy of
spirit seeks to restore the respect and love of spiritual values
of which, they say, the

hi~hest

form has been reached in the

15Smith, p. 334.
16Bochenski, p. 178.
~

17Louis Lavelle, "Preface" to M. F. Sciacca's L'existence de
(Paris, 1951), p. 8.
--

15
course of history by a "synthesis of Platonism and Christianity. fl 18

The difference which separates true spiritualism from

critical philosophy is that the former gra.sps act immediately in
its very occurence, while the latter finds act through induction.
In a private letter to M. Sciacca, Lavelle wrote:

"I can

only renew the expression of our agreement on the principle of
defense of the spirit, of metaphysics and of a Christian Platonism in which one can find that alliance between the reality of
the idea and the value of the person which doubtless constitutes
the very essence

2!

spiritualism.,,19

Whatever difficulties may

lurk in their formal statements, the spirit of these philosophers
echoes sympathetically in the hearts of genuine philosophers.
Sartre may have hit the headlines, but spiritual existentialism
has come inspiringly olose to hitting the truth. 20
Personalism
Personalism is a philosopby; it is not merely an attitude,
nor is it a system.

In tbe broadest sense, personalism is a way

of thinking that makes persona.lity the key to all philosophical
problems.

It maintains that

~

£.it is to be a person or self.

In

18 Ibid • The relations between Lavelle and Platonism will be
discussed in Chapter 3.
19Cited by M. F. Sciacca, tiDal mio carteggio con Louis
Lavelle," Giornale £!. Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952),
490. (Translation and italics mine.)
20 Smith, p. 370.

16
the personalist world if one poses the question:

"What does it

mean to be?" (the fundamental problem in philosophy since Parmenides), one prime fact imposes itself.
means to think, to be conscious. 21

It is that for me, to be

The term "personalismtl is of recent usage.

F}nployed in 1903

by the French philosopher Renouvier to describe his philosophy, it
then fell into disuse.

Vfhen it reappeared in France towards 1930,

there was a very different climate of thought, and the term was
used to designate the first researches of the review Esprit and
of some neighboring groups (Ordre Nouveau) concerning the political and spiritual crisis then arising in Europe. 22 The concept
of personalism today, however, is by no means a novelty.

The

universe of the person is the universe of man, and the personalism of the modern world is grafted onto a long tradition which
some like to traoe back even to Socre-tes' "Know thyself. tl
"The fundamental affirmation of personalism is 'the existence
of free created persons'.

But it is not a gratuitous metaphysical

affirmation; it is a principle of human action and of meaning for
people who take a common attitude in viewing man. tt23

The person

2lFor a fuller treatment of the general notions of personalism see Emmanuel Mounier, Le personnalisme (Paris, 1951), Introductory chapter: "Introduction Familiere a l'univers Personnel,"
pp. 5-17. [English translation by Philip [,"airet: Personalism
(New York, 1952), pp. vii-xx.)
22 Mounier, p~ vii. (English edition, p. 5.]
23Roger Daval, Histoire des idees en france (Paris, 19j6),
p. 109. (Translation mine.) ----

17
is not an object to be regarded, but rather a center of reorientation for an objective universe. 24

Because of the uniqueness of

every individual person, there is at the heart of personalism a
principle of unpredictability which excludes any desire for a
definitive system.
What has been thus far described is distinctive of French
personalism, of which Mounier and the periodical Esprit are the
chief representatives.

There, the personalists make a great

point of applying their doctrine in the political and social
fields.

Mounier opposes personalism to extreme individualism and

its opposite of totalitarianism or extreme collectivism.

Individ-

ualism is abhorred as bringing about the centralization of the
indi vidual in himself, wherear:
is hif:.l decentralization
tives of personal life.

~.::

In

t!;e

first condi tion of personalism

ol-.der to set him in the open perspecoppositi~n

to individualism and to
•

whatever idealism still persists, pers'onalism demonstrates that
the human subject cannot be nourished by auto-digestion; that one
can possess only so much as one gives, or only that to which one
oneself; and no one ean find salvation, either spiritual
or social, in himself. 26

~ives

Mounier does not consider personalism a form of spiritulllism,

24Mounier, Personnalisme, p. 17.

[English edition, p. xx.]

25Ibld. , p. 37.

[English edition, p. 19. ]

26 Ibid • , p. 39.

[English edt tion, p. 21. ]
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despite the name of personalism's chief organ (Esprit).

He sees

in spiritualism a doctrine "which plays at being pure spirits"
(gui joue

~

esprits purs).

This, however, is not true of all

spiritualism, as, for example, the spiritualism of Descartes,
which attaches importance to the union of body and soul.

But,

with many others, Mounier merely wishes to place the emphasis on
incarnation, on ffthat being compounded of light and blood"

(ill

"
""
1 urni ere
'
.!E.!:!.
!1!!.1.!!!2.
!.l des ang ) • He believes in the primitive

character of experience of the second person, you, which precedes
the

1.

For him too, through affirmation of Transcendence, the

person is orientated to the essentials of Christianity which
affirms both transcendence and incarnation. 27
"The personalist type of philosophy tends to recur as a
protest or reaction against the recurrent forms of monism or
'totalitarian' philosophy which are felt to threaten the dignity
and individual value of the human pers.on.

One might call'it the

periodic protest of the personal against the impersonal.,,28

In

this context, however, the words "protest" and "reaction" are not
meant to imply that personalism is something negative.

Rather,

it involves a positive affirmation and interpretation of personality.

A personalist civilization is one whose spirit and

structu.re is ordered to the fulfillment as a person of each one

27Brehier, p. 218.
28Copleston, p. 105.
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who constitutes it. 29
We turn now to a brief look at personalism as it exists and
is understood outside of France.
main tendencies.

There are in personalism two

One is towards an organic view of society, as

in Fichte and Hegel; the other (more typical) is democratic and
reformist and is represented by Kant, Bowne, Mounier, and
Maritain.

"The tendency of this latter group is to test social

systems by their treatment of the individual person, and thus
to emphasize political democracy, to criticize existing systems
of ownership and distribution in so far as they fail to respect
personality, and to make speoific applications of personalism to
problems of labor and management, war and peace, and the like.,,3 0
Although for convenienoe we speak of "personalism" in the
singular, we ought really to say that there is a plurality of
personalisms.

A Christian personalism and an agnostic person•

alism, for instance, differ in their most intimate dispositions
or attitudes.

Nevertheless, because they conform to one. another

in certain realms of thought and in certain lines of practical
conduot concerning the individual or collective order, we are
sufficiently justified in using the same name to describe their
2qc~_
·~I~anue 1 Moun i er,

(Paris, 1936), p. 62.

2£
p.

Man ifes t e

I

~

service

~

personnalisme

30Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Personalism" in A History
Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergillus Ferm, fNew York, 1950),

350.
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tenets. 31
Almost all the European personalisms can be called Christian
personalisms.
tio~.

They have Christianity for

~~eir

central inspira-

M. Maritain has written that the notion of person is a

notion of Christian index which is disentangled and made more
precise by theology.3 2 Within the strong current of Christi~l
personalism are found the inspiration and elements which have
contributed to form the philosophy of Louis Lavelle.

31Mounier, Personnalisme, p. 6. [English edition, p. viii.]
32 Jacques Maritain, Humanisme integral, p. 17. Cited in
Grevillot, Les grands courants 4! la pensee contem~oraine (Paris,
1947), p. 10;7 See also Grovillot, Chapter III:
Le personnalisme chretien,tr pp. 16$-274, for a full treatment of Christianity
and personalism.

CHAPTER

III

BASIC DOCTRINES OF LAVELLE'S PHILOSOPHY
The purpose of this chapter is to give a general view of
the philosophy of Louis Lavelle in its more important aspects.
Obviously, the attempt to encompass the entire philosophy of a
man within a single brief chapter is hopeless.
attempt fills more than twenty books.

Lavelle's own

It has consequently been

necessary to select and choose only those aspects which are
essential to his philosophy and which aid in understanding his
concepts of person and personality.
As has been noted, Lavelle's philosophy can be considered as
a convergence of existentialism, philosophy of spirit, and personalism.

This will now be considered fncloser detail.

with a general

d~scription

Beg-inning

of his philosophy, we will go on to

describe his initial fact, the notions of being, act, and univocity in Lavelle, his doctrines of participation and Platonism,
and finally, accusations of pantheism made against his philosophy.
General Description 2! Lavelle'S Philosophy
A first contact with the philosophic work of M. Lavelle may
well be disconcerting.

Philosophers customarily begin with

immediate data of sense, the world, and facts of consciousness,

21

22
and ascend from this point to (}od.

Lavelle, hov/ever, ins taIls

himself instead at t!ie very center of all things, from which he
proceeds to develop a coherent metaphysical explanation of reality
For him, being is an act (actus), a real experience and a personal
accomplishment.

The initial act or experience of being is inter-

nal knowledge of self, and has the character of an immediate
possession.

By asserting that being is "self-Justifying," Lavelle

wants to affirm its spontaneous and undivided character since he
holds that being gets its meaning from itself and not, as for so
many modern philosophers, from nothingness.

"'rhe immediacy of

union between being and evidence • • • is expressed in the
principle that being has no other end but itself. tIl

A" thing, tI

for Lavelle, becomes a "being" when it is brought into active
consciousness in this internal experionce.
From this starting point Lavelle goes on to assert that
being is not only one but is univocal," and that by our proper
act we are more and more discovering ourselves through an everincreasing participation in tho All, who is God.

Lavelle has

thus definitely established himself in the Platonic tradition,
which he considers the only authentic source of the true "philosophia perennis."

From what has just been described it is not

difficult to understand why Lavelle has been accused of pantheism.
nis effective refutation of this interpretation will be described

.t~Vincent Edward Smith, Idea-Men 2! Today (Milwaukee, 1950),

p. 3,+7.
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further on.
In

~

l'etre, Lavelle has written that there are only two

philosophies from which one can choose:

that of Protaeoras,

according to which man is the measure of all things, and that of
Plato, in which the measure of all things is not man but God, a
God, however, who permits himself to be participated by man. 2
'Ehis gives us a good idea of Lavelle's basic orientation.

But to

prevent misunderstanding, Lavelle assures his reader that, far
from reducing philosophy to an idealist immanentism, he uses the
word "participation" precisely to show that the immanent always
proceeds from the Transcendent; and circling back in a sort of
dialectic, it serves to draw up into the Transcendent all the
elements of knowledge and action. 3
Lavelle is often criticized for having engaged in " a purely
logical game" (B!! pur

j

eu logigue).

way of him in the Nouvelli, Revue

~Gabriel rvr.arcel spoke .in this

Frani~lse

for F'ebruary, 1938. 4

This reproach addressed to the Lavellian method is serious, especially today when philosophical thought is dominated by a sharp

2Louis Lavelle, De l'etre (Paris, 1947), p. 35.
3Louis Lavelle, Letter of May 20, 1946 to M. F. Sciacca.
Cited Oy Sciacca in "Dal mio carteggio con Louis Lavelle," Giornale di Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952), 489.
4Gabriel Marcel, "Compte rendu du livre De l'acte," Nouvelle
Bevue I<'ran9aise, fevrier, 1938, 217-218. Cited by b. R. Loza,
"Climat et methodo de la philosophie de Lavelle," Melanges de
Sciences Religieuse, XI (1954), 212.
--

concern for the concrete and animated by a deliberate prooccupation for remaining in contact wi-(ih the universe in which we live.

If this divergence in attitude really exists between Lavelle and
modern philosophers, it remains for us to conclude not merely
that the doctrine of Lavelle does not respond to the needs of our
times, but also and especially that it is not truly comprehensive
of all the given, and of all the real.>
To answer this difficulty adequately, it must be noted that
hwnan existence can be envisaged on two planes:
menological description and that of metaphysics.

that of phenoModern philos-

ophers are accustomed, in general, to a phenomenological desoription; Lavelle, on the other hand, resolutely brings his attention
to metaphysics.

If one stUdies only the expression and presen-

tation of Lavelle's system, his "dialectic of the eternal present"
appears to be an attempt at evasion

G.~

.the real world.

But if,

under the appearanoes, one seizes the basic intuition which
inspires Lavelle's writings, understanding that for him being is
an act, and each of our limited acts is a participation in the
Act who is God, then the previously obscure elements of Lavelle's
philosophy become clear.

One thus finds that the authentic and

full sense of existence and the world have their true aspect
within the metaphysical orientation which Lavelle adopts. 6

pp. 212-214.
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~

Initial

~

Lavelle, as has been shown, finds his initial fact in an
act, the act of being.
If

His primitive fact may be described as

act accomplishing itself," "being realizing itself, II

!,

Belf-

consciousness," or in existentialist terms, as udecisiont! or
"consent. TI
thus:

In his own inimitable style he has expressed himself

"There is an initial experience which is contained in all

the others and which gives to each of them their weight and depth:
it is the experience of the presence of being.

To affirm this

presence is to affirm simultaneously one's participation in being •
• • .. The peculiar quali ty of philosophic thought is to attach
itself to this essontial experience, to refine its acuteness, to
retain it when it nearly escapes, to return to it when all is
obscure and one has need of

Ii

landmark and a touchstone, to ana-

lyze its content and to show that

al~

our operations depend on it,
•

finding in it their origin, reason, ana source of power. 1t7
at the origin of all thought Lavelle finds a primitive

'rhus

experienc~

which is that of the subject coming to understand himself as

7Louis Lavelle, La presence totale (Paris, 1934), pp40 25-26:
"II y a une experienc;-initiale qui est Impliquee dans toutes les
autres et qui donne
chacune d'elles sa gravite et sa profondeur:
c'est l'experience de 180 presence de l'etre. Reconna!tre cette
~resence, c'est reconna1tre du mema coup la participation du moi
a l'etre • • • • Le propre de la pensee phllosophique est de
s'attacher
cette experience essentielle, d'en affiner l'acuite,
de Ie. retenir quand elle est pres d'echapper, dty retourner quand
tout s'obscurit et que l'on a besoin d'une borne et d'une pierre
de touche, d'analyser son contenu et de montrer que toutes nos
operations en dependent, trouvent en elle leur source, leur raison
d'~tre et Ie
rinci e d
-u
u
"T

a

a

"..----------------------------------------------------------------.
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being, that is, as forming a part of being.
The original fact 1s such that I can neither posit being
independently of the self which grasps it, nor can the self be
posited independently of tile being upon which it is inscribed.
Lavelle elaborates this in his book on being, where he writes that,
if the initial experience is the experience of participation
tllrough which the ego constitutes the existence which is proper
to it, there is obviously a twofold. aspect in this initial experience, and neither aspect can be considered as isolated from the
other.

The first aspect is that of pure lli, or the act which is

only act, while the second aspect is that formed by the world,
where the infini"Cy of act manifests itself in the infinity of
choices and states which seem born of the participation itself.
Lavelle considers the world the "interval" that separates pure
act (God) from the act of participation (ourselves).8
Lavelle's las t published article ':is helpful for a better
unders tanding of this all-impor ',,~,~', c discovery of being in his
thought.

In it he said:

Our firs t phil,osophic discovery, as undoubtedly that
of all men when their reflection has be~un to come
into play, has been that of our proper existence in
the face of a universe which up till then has exclusively rets,ined all our attention, but as a pure spect9.cle. But the discovery of oneself is the extraordinary discovery of a being which participates in the
being of the whole, but in such a way that he is this

BLavelle, De l'3tre, p. 23.
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being instead of just seeing it, that in speaking of it he can say 1 or !!!!.i that he has control
over it and, instead of regarding it from without,
he makes it come into existence from within • • • •
As my first experience was that in which the
spectacle of the world was in no way abolished but
rather abandoned in favor of an act which was entirely
interior, aware of its pure determinability and its
pure exercise, so the second experience was that of
time in which my life was flowing on and which was not
denied but rather rooted in a present coextensive with
Being in which that time itself was the foundation of
its own reality • • • •
A third experience, which was to give the preceding two all their value, was that which Plato no
doubt early experienoed, namely, that the world we
live in is not that of things which we see, but the
world of thoughts whioh we have. Each one of us
lives and dies in the world of his thoughts rather
than in the world of thInr,s.9

9Louis Lavelle, "Temoitage," Les l!:tudes Philosophigues,
~

(1951), 129-130:

VI

"Notre premIere decouverte philosophique, comme oelle de tous
les h<:~es sans doute des que leur r~flexion a commens.,e'a s'exercer, a ete oelle de notre propre existence en face d '..univers qui
jusque la avait retenu exclusivement toute notre attention, mais
oomme un spectacle pur. Or, la decouverte de soi, c'est cette
decouverte extraordinaire d'un etre qui participe
l'etre de tout
mais de telle maniere que cet 3tre, ~ l'est au lieu de le voir,
qu'en parlant de lui, il peut dire ~ ou m2!, qu'il~en a la charge
et qu'au lieu de le regarder du dehors, il le fait etre du dedans.

a

"Comme rna premiere experience etait celle ou le spectacle du
monde etait non point abolu, mais abandonne au profit d'un acte
toutinterieur prenant conscience de sa pure disponibilite, et de
son pur exercice, la seconde experience etait celle du temps ou
rna vie s'ecoulait et qui &tait, non point nie, mais enracine dans
un present coextenslf
l'Etre et ou ce temps lui-meme fondait sa
propre realite • • • •

a

"Une troisieme experience, qui devrait donner touts leur
portee aux deux pr~c~dentes, c'etait oette experience que Platon
a faite sans doute de tres bonne heure, a savoir, que le monde
dans lequel nous vivons n'est pas le monde des choses que nous
voyons, mais le monde des pensees que nous avons. Chacun vit et

~~--------------~

L
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The primitive experience of being for Lavelle, then, is not
merely the experience of the inscription of myself in being, but
also that of participation in being.

It puts us in touch with an

absolute being which, however, is not outside of us at some inaccessible distance since the exercise of our activity can not
exceed the presence of being.

tmus Lavelle sees an identity

between the discovery of Being and that of our own proper being. 10
Notions gf Being,

!£1,

~

Unlvocity

Lavelle, who is Kierkegaardian in many respects, maintains
that being is discovered by the human mind in the experiential
actualization of the mind's coming to know reality, in the "act
accomplishing itself."

He maintains the unity and univocity of

being, and founds his whole philosophy on an ontological argument
which identifies being and the idea

of

it in God.

The affirmation
•

of being is the primary evidence, the starting point of all
philosophy.

To exclude nothingness and to affirm the universality

meurt dans le monde de ses pensees plutot que dans le monde des
choses." (Translation mine.) Other pertinent ref~rences to
Lavelle's writings are: ~#llatre, pp. 9, 23, 294; ~ l'acte,
(Paris, 1934), p. 49; La presence totale, p. 212. See also Dom.
Raymond Loza, O.S.B., WL'experience primitive de L. Lavelle,"
Revue Thomiste, LVI (1956), 271-280.
lOLavelle, De l'etre,p. 308. See also Jean Ecole, "L'experience .de l'etre et le point de depart de la metaphysique selon
Louis Lavelle," Les Studes Philosophigues, VIII (1953), 372-383.
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of being are at bottom one and the same. ll
"(There is] a threefold aspect within the initial presence
of being whose evidence is act.

There is first the Eresence of

Reing, and we are aware of it before adverting to ourselves • • • •
Second, there is the discovery of

~

Eresence to being which was

implied but not actually distinguished in the first awareness ••
• • Lastly, there is the awareness of

~

interiority

~

being,

a recognition that we participate in the presence of being.,,12
The world is no longer an object to be known, but it is a creation
to which we are associated.

In keeping with this line of thought.

man finds himself closer to his fellow men.

"To scorn, to ignore

anyone," Lavelle has said, "is to wish to hurl him into nothingness."13

It might also be noted that, since the idea of being is

itself a being, the only concept that is adequate to it is the
concept of being.

As Lavelle puts it,"it is impossible

~o

pose

the idea of being without perceiving at once that the being of
the idea is the same as the being of which it is the idea.,,14

IlJean Lacroix, "Un philosophe du consentement," Lumiere et
Vie, VII (1952), 105-121. Translated by Dom. Illtyd Trethowan;1IJlPhI1osopher of Acceptance: Louis Lavelle," Downside Review,
LXXI (1953), 372-386. See pp. 374-375 especially.
12Smith, p. 348.

Italics mIne.

l3Quoted by Jean Baruzi in his "Louis Lavelle." Les Ittudes
Philosophigues, VI (Avril-Septembre 1951),139. (TranS:lation
mIne. )
14Cited in Smith, p. 348.

rr~--------~
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Whatever our verdict on his notion of

!£! rather than

~

as the metaphysical point of departure, Lavelle claims several
oonsiderable consequences for his doctrine.
him to bridge experience and philosophy.

First, it enables

Secondly, it reaffirms

the principle that being is intrinsically intelligible.
act is its own sufficient reason.
efficacious.

Thirdly,

And fourthly, act is eternally

Lavelle emphasizes interiority and thus makes each

individual valuable and truly operative as a second cause. lS
'Phe notion of univocity of being in Lavelle's philosophy can
best be described in his own words:

"\Yhen I used • • • [the

notion of univocity] for the first time, it was in no way to
contradict analogy; but it was to combat phenomenalism and to show
that it is impossible to avoid the unity of being and to adhere to
[notions of) a multiple phenomenal existenoe.
following:

My position is the

all beings oan differ, indeed, in so far as tqey are

individual beings.

Their proper being resides, however, in their

very dependenoe with regard to the absolute being who alone is
capable of sustaining them in the totality of being.,,16

15~., pp. 347-349.
16Letter of Louis Lavelle to N. J. J. Balthasar dated December 17, 1950. Cited by Balthasar in his IfL'univocite non immanent
de l'etre total," Giornale di Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto
1952), 433: "Lorsque je l'ar employ'e [la notion de l'univooite]
pour la premiere fois, ce n'etait nullement pour contredire l'anal
ogie: mals pour combattre le phenomenisme et montrer qu'il est
impossible d'eviter Itunite de l'etre et de sten tenir a la multlplicite des formes des existonce phenomenale. Ma position est la
suivant: c'est que tous les etres peuvent bien differer en tant

l
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Lavelle's great contribution to contemporary metaphysics is
his reaffirmation of the ubiquitous, transcendental character of
being as the primary object of human wisdom.

By identifying act

(actus) and being, he attempts a union of metaphysics and experience.

"Credit must go to him likewise for restoring the analogy

of being as a problem in philosophy and for defending the dignity
of man in a climate that sometimes dignifies only dollars.,,17He
does not begin with a preconceived method in philosophy; and,
synthetic as he is, he is ever willing to search through the past
and the present to assimilate truth wherever he comes upon it.
But there are grave problems in Lavelle too.
adequate as a philosophical method?

Is description

"Can a philosophy oarry

oertitude at its heart when its feet are resting on a non-knowledge type of awareness?,,18

But to do more than mention these

difficulties would carry us away from pur goal in this thesis •
•

Participation
The identity of being and act is the central and most orig-

qu1etres individuels. Leur etre propre reside pourtant dans une
meme dependance
l'egard de l'etre absolue qui seul est capable
de les soutenir dans la totalite d'etre. ft (Translation mine.)

a

l7Smith, pp. 368-369.
l8~. A good summary and criticism of Lavelle's system
can be found in Jean Ecole's La metaphysigue de l'etre dans la
philo8ophie de Louis Lavelle TPhilosophes Contemporainsr;-Editions
Nauwelaerts,Parls, 1957, in Chapitre XII: tlReflexions critiques
et complementaires," 231-257.
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inal feature of Lavelle's thought--it is the key to his whole
metaphysics of participation.

Being unfolds itself as one and

univocal, but it is at the same time infinite and above all, pure
act!

God.

For Lavelle, all that exists, exists by a participa-

tion of this pure, infinite act.

By means of tilis participation

Lavelle intends to surmount pantheism and to affirm the transcendence of God.

Lavellian participation is neither inductive nor

deductive, but an initial and constant fact of experience. 19
Human struggle and endeavor, then, may be considered as motivated
by the desire to render our ontic condition less potential and
impertect.

Our pass<.,Ge from thing to person and from state to
act testifies to our finitude and desire for the infinite. 20

Since the activity of the ego participates in the absolute activity, and that by the intermediation of the world and human nature,
different possibilities of action forman are but
of realizing this participation.

differe~t

ways

rfile experience of participation,

then, the initial fact from which all Lavellian philosophy takes
its flight, "seizes on vital consciousness as a personal act.

In

this way the act of consciousness perceives and recognizes its
active participation in Pure Act, who is Himself a Person, and

a

19Bechara Sargi, La participation
l'etre dans la philosoEhie ~ Louis Lavelle-rParis, 1951), pp. 83-88 especIilly.
20James Collins, "Louis Lavelle on Human Participation,!! The
Philosophical ReView, LVI (1947), 168.
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who offers Himself to be participated in by consciousness.

This

consciousness, then, is an act participating in the Absolute itself.

Here is all its reality, all the reality of the ego which

in no way differs from consciousness.,,21
Lavelle views man as a limited participation of the Infinite,
as indeed, every creature necessarily is.
bears a resemblance to the divinity.

But the creature still

Lavelle wrote:

flIt is a

fact that God cannot create things (which are only appearances)
but only beings, and that he cannot create them without making
them participate in his essence, that is to, say, giving them the
power ef self-creativity just as he eternally creates himself.,,22
The words ef Professor Cellins en Lavelle serve as an apt cenclusien to this section on participatien.

"Lavelle has always kept

clearly before him the twofold aim of his philosO,phy:

it must

maintain a certain unity in being incQrder to, allew for creaturely
•

participatiO,n and for knO,wledF~e o'f the' Transcendent, and it must
likewise maintain the distinctien between beings which have personal autonomy •• • • The vocation of the creature is to bring
21Sargi, p. 11.

(Translation mine.)

22LO,uis ~avelle, "NO,tes sur Ie sujet: peurquO,i y a-t-il un
mende?," Giornale di Metafisica, X (3) (MagfjiO,-Giugno 1955), 384:
"C'est une 4vIdeftcrqUe Viea 11& peut pas creer des cheses (qui ne
sont que des apparences) m~a,.slftl~t des etres et qulil ne peut
les creer qu'en los rai~~~~t~&i~e~~son ess~nce, crest-a-dire
en leur do~an~ a eux-m~_"""la RiuJ~sanca"..:3i\ se creer comme il se
cree lui-meme eternelletnent.~,(~~1:is~ed PJsthumO,USlY; translatiO,n
mine.)

~<~~:~~
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forth its own being by sharing in the power of God, for the
creatlwe is no mere limitation of God."23
Platonism in Lavelle
"One is a philosopher in so far as he Is a follower of Plato"
(Qg philosophe [!!£] selon gu'on Elatonise.)

very words. 24

Such are Lavelle's

The myth of the cave is for Lavelle the introduc-

tion to philosophy.

There is a sensible world and an intelligible

world, a world of appearances and a world of hidden realities,
which are the only authentic ones.

And one of these worlds hides

the other from us, but not to the extent of making us unable to
discern it or of preventing us from reaching it.

We must come out

of the cave, from the world of shadows, and discover little by
little the world of true ideas. 2$ But this myth can be misunderstood and the wrong aspects of

Platoni~m

attributed to Lavelle •
•

F10r him reali ty is not behind but wi thin appearances; and being
is not behind but

~

experiences.

Lavelle himself has noted what

he considers the shortcomings of the full Platonic doctrine.
writes:

He

"But it seems to us that Plato gave way to an idolatrous

penchant when he considered that he consolidated our thoughts by

23Collins, p. 177.

a

24Cited by Gonzague Truc, De J.-P. Sartre
L. Lavelle; ou
desagregation ~ reintegration (Paris, 1946), p: n~4. (Transla.
tion mine.)
2$For fuller discussion of Platonism and Lavelle see Truc,
pp. 133-158; Lacroix, p. 374; and Lavelle, "Temofhage,1I
p. 128.
,..

I
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making ideas of them, that is to say, objects accessible only to
pure intelligence, and that it was to ienore the true function of
things to reduce them to being only illusory and useless copies of
ideas when they were for us, on the contrary, the double way by
which each spirit became capable of utilizing his own possibili.
ties, that is to say, of actualizing them, and of commWlicatlng
with other spirits in a universe which was the same for all.,,26
Elsewhere, however, speaking of striot existentialism, he complained that it was an anti-Platonism, observing that Platonism
always comes to lifo again after it has been neglected.

frhis is

neoessarily so, he said, since, al thou,":h Platonism ceaselessly
denies the world we have under our eyes whero our existence
unfolds itself, this denial is the only way of access to the life
of the spirit, the life that is truly ours.27
Existentialism's strong emphasi~on the existence of ,things
has already been pointed out.

Platonism and Lavelle prefer to

26Lavelle,
"Temoi9iage," p. 130: "Mais il nous semblait que
,
Platon cedait a une sorte de penchant idolatre, quand il oroyait
oonsolidaire nos pensees en en faisan~ des idees, c'est-a-dire des
objets encore, accessibles seulement a l'intelligence pure, et que
o'etait meconna!tre la fonction veritable des choses de les
reduire
n'etre que des copies illusoires et inutiles des idees,
la o~ elles etaient pour nous au contraire le double moyen par
lequel chague esprit devenait capable de mettre en jeu ses propres
possibllites, c'est-a-dire de les actualise, et de oommuniquer
avec les autres esprits dans un univers qui etait le meMe pour
tous • " ( Transla ti on mine.)
,~

~

a

~

27Louis Lavelle, "Preface fl to M.
(Paris, 1951), p. 8.

}4'.

Sciacca's Ltexistence ~

stress the priority of essence.

They conceive the essence as

pre-existing, and the being exists only in so far as it partlcipates in the essence.

Of course, God is the being whose essence

implies existonce and whose boundless existence constitutes the
center of all essences.

But in human essences there is an ideal

type which embraces all that can be realized of what is properly
human, and it is towards this that \.;e must look in order to find
the qualities and features that we should eive to our existence.
For Lavelle, as for all Platonists, what counts is not to exist
but to choose the essence that is best.
valueless.

Of itself existence is

"We may say that essence is not merely the possibility

of existence, or its content, but that it gives value to existence.,,28
In La conscience

~

soi Lavelle most clearly expounds his

re-statement of Platonism, or
Augustianism.

perhap~

more accurately, of

"The real world,1t he sa~s, "i9 the world of ideas

and not the world of things.

From the moment we penetrate into

it we find ourselvos enlightened; our own nature, our destiny,
the conduct we must follow, our relations with other beings,
appear to us in a moving lieht that we delight to contemplate,
and that magnetizes our will. • • • We do not in any sense create
ideas.

'rhey are the elements of a material universe.

28Louis Lavelle, De l'acte (Paris, 1937), p. 104.
lation mine.)

rrhey re-

(Trans-
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veal themselves to us by an act of intelligence as things reveal
themselves to us by an a.ct of attention." 29

:F'rom this view we

can see how Lavelle I s philos ophy does constitute a synthesis o.f
essentialIsm, existentialism, and the philosophy of splrit.

This

also expla.ins reference to his philosophy as an "essentialtst
existentialism" or a "spiritual exlstenti3.lismtf.
But Lavelle did not feel that Platonism alone was adequate.
He felt, rather, that Platonism risks sacrificing the person to
the idea if it does not incorporate into itself the influence of
the Christian tradition. 30 Lavelle's desire was to maintain and
reanimate a philosophy Which could be considered as of Platonic
and Cartesian inspiration but in which the share of Christianity
was capital.

Lavelle recognized that this undertaking was open

to widely differing forms of thought, but he desired that within
his system there should reign an agreement on t!1e primacy of the
life of the spirit and on the impossibility of leaving the direc29Louis Lavelle, ~ conscience de !2i (Paris, 1933), pp. 6061: "Le vrai monde, c'est Ie monde des idees et non pas Ie monde
des choses. Des que nous y penetrons, nous nous sentons eclaires;
notre propre nature, notre destinee, la conduite que noua devons
tenir, nos relations avec les autres etres, nous apparaissent dans
une lumiere mobile qui rejouit notre regard et aimante notre
volunte • • • • Nous ne creona point les idees. Elles sont les
elements d'un univers de matiere. Elles se revelent
nous par un
acte de l'intelligence comme les choses se revelent
nous par un
acta du regard." (Translation mine.)

a
a

30Louis Lavelle Letter of ~ay 20, 1946 to M. F. Sciacca.
Cited by Sciacca in fl Dal mio carteggio con Louis Lavelle," Q.!.Q.r.~ di Metafisica, VIr (4) (Luglio-Agos to 1952), 489.

tiOll of human conduct to science and different techniques. 3l
Pantheism

!!!

Lavelle

From what has been said thus far it is not difficult to
unders tand how the charGe of pan t.l}6 i sn could be brought agalns t
these ideas.

Many of Lavelle's statements would seem to admit of

only this interpretation, as for example:

ItGvd is the true

essence of all beings, and, as is often said, more interior to me
than I am to myself. tI

-------

(Dleu est lfessence veritable de tous les

--l!. ill souvent, plus interieur a !!.!.21 gue moi-

etres, II connne .2!!
meme.}3 2 But in reality Lavelle did not intend a pantheism, and
considers that he has escaped this reproach by his oonception,

unitary and double at the same time, of freedOIll and participation.
The purpose of

tl

things It (tile given) in Lavelle IS philos ophy is to

send us continually back to '1beingslt ,(oonscious possession of the
•
given in the act which is being.) In s: sense nature is that
which sends me back unoeasingly to myself.

It is in returning to

myself that I disoover the origin and source of being.
cov~ring

In dis-

oursol ves in this way, in. our profoundes t depth, vIe dis-

cover also the nature of the Being by whom alone we oxist.
what the intuition reveals to us is that heing in act. 33

3I Ibid., p. 487.
32La velIe,

!2!.

(Letter dated April 22, 1946.)

1 r acte, p. 105.

33See Laoroix, p. 377.

(Translation mine.)
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Perhaps the strongest proof advanced by Lavelle against
pantheism is his idea that we do not share in being as parts in
a totalized whole, but rather as personal agents united with a
God who is the ?ersonal source of our reality.

rhe incommunica-

bility proper to a person prevents either an identification of
absolute and participated being, or a designation of God as the
point of convergence of an infinite number of finite persons. 34
More than once l.lavelle had to handle this objection to his system.
Here, in his own words, is the answer he gave to his friend, In. F.
Sciacca:
I a~ grateful to you for having been kind enough to
point out the fears to which my position on God and
freedom have given rise. You fear too that a suspicion
of pantheism or Spinozism may be ~enerated in the minds
of some readers. This is not the first time that I have
heard such a reserve expressed, but I always defend myself against it. I believe that it is precisely there
that the remedy is found for all possIble pantheism ••
For if God is a being who is suf~fcient to himself or
who gives being to himself, creation for him consists
alwa.ys in the communication that he makes of his being,
in a gift of himself which he renews infinitely. But
this gift which he makes of himself would be illusory
if there were no possibility for each created being
of giving himself by an act which renders him the
cause of himself, that is to say, by a free act.
Also, it is our subordina.tion to God that frees us
instead of enslaving us. This explains both why God
created consciences--and the world as the possibility
of their existence-and why we are always able to turn
against God the very freedom which comes from him and

34Col11ns, p,

176.

40
which can be exercised fully only in union with hi~ • .15
In summary, then, we n:.ay say that Lavelle's philosophy
begins with a reflexive analysis of the one evident reality, our
consc iousness of our being.

In thi s experience, whlc:l. is an

Be

t,

we can develop our essence thr(mgh choices born of our free will.
Being is precisely this act through which we participate in the
very being of God, and our life should properly develop by an
ever-growing participation through our freedom in the pure act,
who is God.

Freedom, of course, implies an importance in the

being who exercises it.

These two factors will be discussed in

35Louls Lavelle, Letter of May 20, 19t~6 to M. F. Sc laces..
Cited by Sciacca in "Dal mio cartegglo con Louis Lavelle," Gior~ di Jtietafisica, VII (4) (Luglio:':'Agosto 1952), 489:
Je vous remercie aussi de voulo!r bien de me dire 1es
craintes que vous a suggeree la ,relation que j'etablis
entre Dieu et la libertJ' at Ie S:OUP90n de pantheisme •
ou de spinozisme qu'elle peut faire nattre dans lfesprit
de quelques lectures. Ce n'est pas la premiere fois
que j t entands formular une telle reserva. j'l[ais je me
defends touJours contre elle. Je cr~is precisement
que c'est la que se trouve Ie remade contre tout pantheisme possible. Car si Dieu est un etre qui se
suffit ou qui se donne l'etre
lui-r:tome, lu creation
pour lui consista toujours dans la communication qu'il
fait de son ~tre, dans un don de 30i qui se renouvelle
infiniment: mais ce don qu'il fait de lul ...meme sarait
illusoire, si ce n"tait pas la possibilit~ pour chaque
" d e se d onner 1 'eA
A par un acte
eAt re cree
ret a' lui-meme
qui rend cause de soi, c'est-a-dire par un acte libre.
Ains! c'est notre subordination
Dieu qui nous libere,
au lie".l de nous asservir. Ce qui expl:'Lque
la fois
pourquoi Dieu cree des consciences--et Ie monde comme
p08sibilite de leur existence,-et pourquoi IlOUS pOUvons toujours retournar contre Dieu cette liberte meme
qui vient de lui et que ne s'exerce pleinement que dans
son union avec lui. (Translation mine.)

a

a

a

the following chapter where Lavelle's concepts of person and
personality will be elaborated.

CHAPTER FOUR
LAVELLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF PERSON AND PERSONALI'rY:
THE PRIMACY OF FREEDOM
In giving a philosophical explanation of the human person,
St. Thomas and the other medieval theologians placed emphasis on
the human substance. l But this emphasis was destined to change.~
Several centuries later Descartes placed his emphasis on the
self-consciousness of the spiritual substance, the whole essence
of which was "to think," and this set the tone of all subsequent
inquiries.

John Locke, for instance, in his Essay Concerninr;

Hu..man Understanding describes the person as a "thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider
itself as itself.")

In a very true sense we may say that all

modern philosophy tends to look on conaciousness or self-con-

lpertinent references to st. Thomas' writings on "person"
SeT., I, 29, 1; 85, 7; ~., II, 75 and 8); ~. ~ An.,
~.!~., 25, 1; ~M., 9,2.
are:

).

2ft'lor a brief his tory of concepts of "person" see }<"'. Copleston, S.J., "The Human person in Contemporary Philosophr," Chapter
VIII of Contemporary PhilOSOph, (London, 1956), 103-124; especially PP. 103-1°4.- See also ames H. VanderVeldt, O.F.M., and
Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism (New York, 1952),
Chapter 1: "Person and Personality," pp. 1 ..14.
r.
~hap.

3John Locke, !!! Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II
XXVII, sec. 9.
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sciousness as the chief characteristic of person and personality.
This can be seen clearly in Hegel, for whom the progress of Mind
or Spirit consists largely in the advance of self-consciousness.
"Consciousness" 1s presence to self in being through varying
experiences.
he writes:

This is the point that Professor Knudson makes when
"From the metaphysical point of view the most impor-

tant thing conneoted with personality is the faot that in it unity
and identity are co-existent with plurality and Change. u4
Two ourrent philosophical movements in which Lavelle has been
found to participate are especially concerned with person and
personality.

They are existentialism and personalism.

In this

chapter brief consideration will be given to the notion of person
in each of these schools of thought, taking Marcel as a representative of the first and Mounier as representing the second.

The

relation and application of these ideas,to Louis Lavellets.philosophy w111 then be shown in detail, with special attention given
to the important concept of freedom.
Existentialists stress the difference between a human person
and the things of nature which man uses.

For an existentialist

there is a sharp difference between the Umwelt, the world of
things or objects, and the Mitwelt, or world of persons.

In h1s

existentialist philosophy, for instanoe, Gabriel Marcel shows how

4Albert C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism (Boston,
1949), p, 83.
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one becomel a ·peraon· by transcendIng one's aelf-enelosednesa
through love tor other persons and tree acceptance of a perianal,
spirl tual relatloDBhip wIth God..

He laya emphaaia on the indIv-

idual, conerete subject, which i8 neither 1dent1cal w1th the
empir1cal ego nor a moment In the subjeotiv1tr of a Kantlan tltansoend~tal

ego.

The ego (le

mel) or aelf-enolosed oonao10usnea.

in which man is a member ot the anonymous "one n (!!sm.) is dlstingut.hed trom the pera<m.
b)" a commitment.

For Marcel the peNon ls oharacter1zed

I atfirm m)"selt as a person in the measure that

I assume responsib1l1ty folt what I do and sa7 1n work, aetion, or
the whole course of lite."
it,' cannot be exhausted in

Because ot its v8r1 nature. personal ...

an,-

one partioular 'ooJllDitment sinoe it

participate. in Being, whiah la 1 ta beginning and ita end. 6
The pel'lonalieta, on the other hand, regard man as capable
ot beoca!ng a "person,· but a. tbre ...ned at the same time 'bJ' a
•

"

tendenc)" to .urz-ender either to egocentrio individualia. or to
sub.erslon in the to tali t7 •
indlvidual and the person.

!he1 dl. tingu1ah .harp11 between the
"Individual" 1. used in a pejoratlve

eenae to denote man con.idered aa a center or epring ot egolstl0
des1re.

"Personn Is conceived b,. the peraonall.ts in close

cormectlon with the idea of a moral vocatlon.

"Individual" and

·perlon" are not separate, but two alpects ot one human rea11t7.

50&br1e1 Marcel.

6Ibid .,

!2!2

PP. 32-33.

Viator (Parls,

1944),

p.

26.
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It 18 but a question ot uniting them hierarchically.

Emmanuel

Mounier, the ohlef modem French personalist, has given careful
though t to his def1ni tion of person:
being," he says,

"const~tuted

"A person i. a spiri tual

as such by a manner of subsistence

and .ot 1ndependence in belns} 1t maintains this subslsience by
its adherence to a. hierarchy or value. freely adopted,

a8sl~latedi

andllved, by a responsible selt-commltment and by a constant
converslon.

I,

thus unltlesall Its actlvlt,rln freedom and

develops 1 ta ownunlque voea tlon, moreover, by means of creatlve
aots.,,7
Whlle the person ls a soclal belng, he Is, nevertheless,
more than a mere member ot a group.

Rather he Is orientated

towarda a 80ciety ot persons .ho are tree, morally responslble
hUJllall beings.

Aa Mounier 1t'l'i tes:

"The person Is not

t

something'

tha t on. can tind a t the end ot an analysis, nor 18 1 t a 4.tlnable

comblnatlon ot charaoteristios.
CQuld be lilted:
~

It l1;:' ••re a sua-total, the Ite!18

but thls Is the reaUty who ..e content. oannot

Rut !nto!!!. 1nv!ptoa (Gabriel :Marcel).

It they could it would

b. determlned by th_J but the person Is self-determlning and. tree
1Bmmanuel Mounier, Manlt.fte a~ servlce ~ p!ESonnallam.
(Parll, 1936), p. 63: dune personne eat un Itre splrltuel conatltu' camme tel par un man1&re du sUbsiatance et d'lndependance dans
Ion ItreJ e11e entretlent cette subslstence par son adh'.lon a une
hierarchl. d. valeurs 11bremen t adopt'es, asslmil'es, .t vacuea
par un engagement respona.bla .t un constanta converslon; elle
unit1. a1ne1 toute SOD activit' dans 1& libert. at devaloppe par
surcrolt,
coups dtact•• createura, 1& alngular1t' de sa vocatlon." (Transla tlon mine.)

a
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It is a presence rather than a being, a presence that is active,
without limits. u8 And again Mounier writes: "In its inner experience the person is a presence directed towards the world and
other persons, mingled with them in universal space.

Other

persons do not limit it, they enable it to be and to grow.

The

person only exists thus towards others, it only knows itself in
knowing others, only finds itself in being known by them • • • •
Just as a philosopher who from the start confines himself to
thinking never finds the doorway to being, so the man who begins
by shutting himself in himself never finds his way towards others •

• • • One might almost say that I have no existence save in so
far as r exist for others, and that to be is, in the final
analysis, to 10ve.,,9
From these sketches we can see that there are definite
differences between personalism and existentialism.

Persqnalism

emphasizes the person's orientation towards society and other
persons; existentialists have a tendency to belittle objective,
social institutions.

Perhaps one reason for this, as Mounier has

suggested, is that existentialism tends to describe authentic
existence in negative terms, whioh involves tearing oneself away
from the mentality of the crowd.

Personalists view the person

8Ennnanuel Mounier, Personalism (l~ew York, 1952), trans.
Philip Mairet, p. 35.
9 ~., p. 19.
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and society of persons as a positive standard.

The theme of self-

creating is common to both; for personalists it constitutes
personality; for existentialists it is the achievement of freedom
and the fulfillment of one's nature. lO
Before concluding this section on modern theories of the
person, let us briefly consider the philosophy of a modern
Christian personalist from among Thomistic philosophers.

Jacques

Maritain accepts the notion of matter as the principle of individuation, and describes individuality as "that which excludes from
myself all other men," and as "the narrowness of the ego, forever·
threatened and forever eager to grasp tor i tselt. ,tll
Like many modern philosophers, Maritain places his emphasis
on freedom as the chief characteristic of the human person.
he holds that one can become a person,

ceas~

Thus

to be a person, or

descend into being a mere "individual," a mere "self."

In. The

Degrees of Knowledge Maritain writes that Ita person is a centre of
freedom Which confronts things, the universe, God, talks with
another person, communicates with them by intelligence and affection. tt 12

Personality, for him, is the subs is tence of the spiri-

10F\rederick Copleston, S. J., Contemporary Philosophy (London,
1956), p. 108.
IlJacques Maritain, ~ Person

1947),

p.

27.

.!!!£ ~

Common Good (New York,

l2Jacques Mari tain, The Degrees 2f. Knowledge (Hew York, 1938).
trans. Bernard Wall, p. 2847
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tual soul oommun10ated to the composite.

It consists in individ-

uality (not individuation, which is a bodily characteristic),
unity and inteerity, subsistence, intelligence, will, liberty, and
the possession of the self by the self. l )

Thus Maritain views

personality as a substantial, metaphysical perfection which opens
out in the order of operation to psychological and moral values.
"Man has to work for his persona.lity, just as he must work for
his liberty; and for that he mus t pay a very high pri.c e •

Indeed,

in the field of action, a man will be a persona.lity (the maker of
his own self) only when his reason, by means of organized virtue
and inspired by love (no less than God's Spirit) gathers up his
soul into his hands--anima
the hands of God.

~

1B

manibus meis semper--and into

For thus he gives to that torrent of oonfliot ..

ing forces within him, the beautiful unity of a moral profile,
which is but the seal of his radical :ontological unity. "ll~.,
In this first part of this chapter we havo tried to describe
the climate of modern philosophies of person.

Personalism holds

that the true person is manifested only when one is "outer-directed" to the world of persons and things other than himself.

Exls

entialism, on the other hand, in the doctrine of Gabriel Maroel,
is ohiefly concerp-ed with the concrete, individual, experienoing
subjeot, who must affirm or

l)~., p. 287.

14~., p. 28$.

con~it

himself to the reality he
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experiences.

In the following section it will be shown how Louis

Lavelle's ideas of person and personality are a combination of the
personalist and existentialist notions of person and the Platonic
idea of participation-thus forming a metaphysical doctrine which
synthesizes the various modern philosophical notions of person and
personality.
Person and Personality !n Louis Lavelle
As has been shown, the "I" or tlegol! for Lavelle is a participated being, tllat is, something first found within being which
freely gives itself its interior being by an act which is an
acceptance.

"Man is a being caught up (engage) in matter which

indi vidualizes and separa.tes him, and . ~e is called upon to surmount that barrier in order to rise to the purity of the spirit
that is One.

By acts of the will he posits himself as a spirit

in his own proper and individual bein&, thus participating in the
creative activity of the Pure Act.

Thanks to intelligence, he

transcends the limitations of his individuality and is able to
conceive the universal, which thus opens itself to a participation
that can thereafter be realized by his will.,,15

For Lavelle, man

is not only man; he is a spirit who lives, acts, and grows according to his participation in the Spirit, God.

A problem which

a prominent plaoe in Lavelle's thought is that of knowing how

l5Paul Foulquie, Existentialism (London, 1948), p. 114.

hol~
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conscious beings can have a friendship with one another.
pre.enc·. totale Lavell e ·wri tea:

-

In La

"Behind all. the partioular

questions that we can pose for oUl"selves, the problem oi' being
and the ego is the only one whioh interests us prOi'oundly.n16 And

again:

"Communioation between eons clous beings Is possible,

doubtless, only belond the one and the other and In a deep and
serious interior! ty' which ia common to both, to whioh each penetrates by the medIation ot the other."17

The ego, tor Lavelle, is

not something that tollows upon c.onsoiouanes..
the

.ame act that the

It is in one and

ego and consciousness are g1 ven.

Apart trom the body in whioh it Is existing, the ego, or selt,
is nothing.

It I, an empty" torm which only the non-self can

nalrlsh or complete.

We must make a distinot10n, theretore,

be tween our sel ves and the world, and cons fJCl uentl,. we mus t have a
lim1ted body.18

By my body I became

an

exiatent object tor

another, and an individual aenter ot senaationa and representatiD1'l8
tor myselt.

"Further, it 1. rIght that we should love even our

bodle., Inasmuch as th ey are a par t of our pers on and are the a on...
dltlon ot our spIritual llte. n19 The theory ot!2!.!. oorps (lIQ' body)

16Louis Lavelle,
(Tra.nslation mine.)

~ prAsanae total~ (Par1s, 1934), p. 3).

17De l'ytre (Par!., 1947), Introduotion, p.
lation idne.

l~ l'acte (ParIs, 1931), pp. 401-402.
199uatre Saints (Par!a, 19$1), p. 209.

3).

(Trana-
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holds as important a pl.ace in Lavelle's thought as in that of
Gabriel Marcel.

This body is both mine and an object in the world

which bears witness to my participated being and to my placement
in the world. 20 Matter servos as the support for action and the
basis of objective communication between persons.

But material

life is only a means whereby we acquire the life o.f the spirit
and determine our complete essence.

As a co-principle in human

nature, the body helps to keep an individual spirit unique.
Because we have bodies, we are bound by sensation and time.
Sens9.tion gives contact \'Vith the present; time is an instrurnent
of onr personal development placed at our

d:t3~Josal

to convert

floating states of consciousness into integrated personal actuality, and thus we construct our subjective life. 21
flaving noted the importance of matter, or a body which is a
necessary element for us as participated beings, we must give

".

special attention now to the freedom we possess and its importance
in Lavelle's understanding of the human person.

Our experience

makes us aware not only of our corporal existence but also of our
freedom or liberty.

By means of our liberty we realize oUJ"selves

through choices which determine and shape our being.

Ours is a

20For spec;fic passages on the importance of the body in
Lavelle, see Presence, pp. 78, 154-155; ~, pp. 402-403.
21See .Tames Collins, IlLouis Lavelle on Human Participation"
The Philosophical ReView, LVI (1947), 156-lA3; especially pp. 168-

169.
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liberty which supposes matter.

"Each of us has a situation in

the universe wiuch is proper to him, it is submitted to a certain
number of conditions v{ilich in no way depend on him, which he has
not chosen, but without which he would not exist as a particular
being. n22
'Nith the introduction of this notion of freedo'TI we touch upon
the central point in Lavelle's doctrirle of person and personality.
Indeed, he calls freedor.!. the "heart of myself. 1123
the central factor in tho problem of
participation would be inexplicable.

pa.rticip~ltion.

Freedom is also
Without it,

liThe end of freedom is the

perfection of the subject who exercises it.

It is the relation-

ship between different possibilities [of the person's activities]
and their individual realization which constitutes the permanent
dialogue of participation.

Self-creation by participati ')n is the

autonomous realization of certain poEisibilities possessed .at the
base of our free choice." 24 In Lavelle's own words, freedom or
liberty is our "participation itself inasmuch as it is a participation in an act which is a cause of itself.,,25
Lavelle looks upon freedOM as the power of creative initia22Louis Lavelle, ~ puissances £B. .!12.Ql (Paris, 19Lt-8), p. 167.
23Acte, p. 189.
24Bechara Sarr,i, La particlps. ti'm a l' etre dans 1 a philosophie de Louis Lave11e\Paris, 1957), p. 92.
25Lavelle, ~, p. 198.
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tlve trlrough the use of whic;l 'fle

ma~:::e

o'...lrsalves participate more

and more in the All, or totality of being.

?'urtflor, this freedom

is something receIved, and is orientated to society with others.
La.velle arg;ues that the exlstenco of n moral order
existence of a plurality of free beings.

the

ttl have need of other

fr-eedo!llB because my freedom can only taln;. another

object.

de~1ands

freedo~l 8.S

l'ta

We are well aV/are that it truly exercises itself only in

the presence of a r!'ee being and not in the presonce :.Jf a. thing.
It 1s the encountor wi th a freodom whioh is notL'1ine t:lat obliges
!frJ freedom to quostlorl itself,to become deoper, and evon to

actualize 1 tself .1'26

L"l Lavello I t'J pJ:lilosophy, the orea. tion of'

ted only through the act of' participation.

t~w

so1:t Is 01"1"60-

In fact it would not

be an exaggeration to 1iH1Y that Ltivtlllo to. wh(llo ph.ilosophy i.:; a

description of t:lia oraat1on af t:10 :1O'lf by tho solf. 27

P~ut

although Lavelle asserts that we croate ourllolvea, he in no way
intends to attribute to u:s a freedom so cOr:lplete that \10 are solf28
sufficient ill orea ting oUl"sel ves..
Our ego resides essentially

26 Ibid •• p. 18S: tlJtai besoin des autres libertes parce que
ma lib.rte ne peut prendre qutune autre liberte pour objet. Noua
sentona bien qu'elle ne s'exerce vraiment quten presence d.'un atre
libra at non point en presence dtune ollose. Crest la rencontre
d'une liberte ~ul ntest pas Is. mlenne qui oblige la mienne a
s'interroger, a s'o,ppro:fondir, et r:13me .. stactuallser.tl (Translation ro!.ne.)
~

27Jean Eoole, 1!!. metaph,slgue de l'3tre
Louis Lav01le (Parls, 195,), p. Y>3.
28

2.!ll! 1!.

phl1osophle
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in the aot by whioh it exists--a partioipating aot.

Our liberty,

then, is the disposition or use of the existenoe whioh we possess
and the ways which are offered. to us to use it. 29
But if it is the same thlnr, to oreate oneself and to participate, and if, on the other hand, the possible is that which our
liberty oan do with our nature, then to participate or create
oneself seems to be essentially the discovery and aoceptance of
the powers of our na. ture in order to rend er them our own.

'rhe ac t

of aoceptanoe, Lavelle sa.ys, is nothing more than oonsciousness
of our partioipation in the great All. 30

But the Lavellian philos

ophy aspires less to elaborate a theory of participation than to
give a total solution to the existence of the participant.

In

fact, at every moment experience reveals the individual, personal
participant to us. 31

Our liberty is given to us in order that we

may realize or conquer our essenoe.

~For

Lavelle the whole ques-

tion of how we can oreate ourselves i~{ oontained in clarifying
the association between our existence and our essence. 32
In

~

1 'ame humaine Lavelle maintains that the problem of the

relationship between essence and existence was the central ques-

291E..!£.

See also Lavelle, ~, p. 3t~3.

30 Lavelle, Puissances, pp. 151-152.

31S argi, p. 104.
32 Ecole, pp. 96, 154.
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tion of traditional ontology.

But for him the problem is meaning-

less except when referred to the problem of the human person. 33
Although there exist different freedoms, or free bein{"s,
which are separate and mutually exclusive, each possesses a mutual
solidarity and union in virtu.e of its relation (by participation)
to Pure Act, the Transcendent Free Being, God.

By its very

nature freedom is directed towards the creation of a society of
free pers ons who, in turn, reach out to t:l:e plent tude of being,
to God.

Thus Lavelle's doctrine of the human person is closely

dependent on his metaphysics of being.

Freedom, which is received

and orientated to others, is a participation in infinite creative
freedom. 34
For Lavelle "person" and ttpersonality" are but two aspects
of one thing.

"Person" indicates the power that an individual

has of uniting himself by his own initiative in a closer participation in the All; and "personali tyW is the participation he
possesses from the Absolute Personality, without which the essential character of the person would be destroyed. 35
'rhe characteristic property of liberty is, then,
to found our personality, that is to say, to
permit us to discover and assume our original
vocation in the interior of the All. This is the

33De llame humaine (Paris, 1951), p. 210.
34Acte, p'. 185.
35Sarg i, p. 71.

See also Copleston, S.J., pp. 122-123.
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only possible condition for each belnp;'s becOMing
a focus 2! initiative • • • • But personality cannot be identified with liberty. This latter is a
pure power which it is impossible not to actualize
even if by discourageMent or sloth we refuse to
employ it. But it supposes matter which is furnished
ror it by indivlduality. The person is therefore
the synthesis or the individual and liberty. It is
nei ther the one nor the other • • • • But t:le characteristic property of the person is to take into his
own hand the destiny of the individual, to detach
him rrom the yoke of Interest and instinct, and to
confer on him consciousness of his Qgeatlve power
in regard to himself and the world. J
For Lavelle, the person is established in all his moral
gravity when he assumes responsibility through the experience of
being and through freely sharing in the act which binds him
decisively to Pure Act.

"Act is at the same time a person and the

entrance to all personal existence.,,37
The person is not behind impersonations or appearances, but
in them.

The mystery of the subject is not hidden away in some

recess from which we must extractitj ,it is everywhere, aria

3t>r,avelle, Puissances, pp. 163-164: tiLe propre de In liberte
est done de fonder notre personnallte, c'est-a-dire de noua permettre de decouvrir et d'assumer notl"e vocation originale a l'inte
rieur du Tout. Car cela n'est possible qu'a condition que chaque
~tre devienne un foyer d'initiative • • • • Pourtant In personnalita ne peut etre identifi~e avec la liberte. Celle-ci est un pur
pouvoir qu'il est impossible de ne point mettre en oeuvre, meme si
par decouragement ou l?ar paresse, nous en refusons l'emploi. Mals
elle suppose une matiere qUi lui est fournie par l'individualite.
Et la personne est justement la synthase de l'indivldu et de la
liberte. Elle n'est ni l'un ni l'autre • • • • Mais la propre de
la personne, c'est de prendre en main la destinee de l'individu,
de l'arracher au joug de l'inter~t et de l'instinct, de lui donner
la conscience de son pouvoir createur a l'egard de lui-m3me et du
monde. (Translation mine.)
37Acte

,7
penetrates the totality of the ego and all its acts 11ke an
atmosphere. 38

The person does not reside only in a state where

will and nature are almost contused, but is rather a possession
of the self which is continually produced, and consequently an
ideal to be realized by moral effort, a victory to be obtained. 39
The person is not made one with the spiritual, which is never
given, but he makes himself into a spIrItual being, he "chooses"
himselt.

The person, therefore, is always a permanent creation

ot the self.
"What are the condItions which make the person?

'!'here

cannot be a person where there is no interiority, subjectivIty,
and a secret of the being with himselt • • • • There is a person
only where there is an activity which permits the ego to constitute itself with the elements Which it tinds already in itself
but by an operation which depends only on itselt."4o
The person indicates in the individual the power he has by
participation of going out of his individuality in order to unite
himself by personal initiative to the universal.

"Unity, inter-

iority, initiative, responsibility, and the assumptIon of the self

38Jean Laoroix, "A Philosopher of Acceptance," Downside
Review, LXXI (1953), 374. (Translated from the French by Dom.
Illtyd Trethowan.)
39collins, p. 176.

See also Lavelle, Puiasances, p. 16,.

40Lavelle, Puissances, p. 165.

(Translation mine.)

i .
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by the self are the elements by which act defines itse1f."4l
They are the distinctive characteristics of the person.

"The

individual receives the dignity of the person only from the
universal act which imparts it. n42
It is in the presence of being that Lavelle begins philosop~,

but this is still a confused experience that needs analysis.

The analysis involves a series of operations, in the course of
which our personalit,y constItutes itself.

Uncovering its own

true essence, our personality unItes itself to being, but this
time in an intelligible act where the initial experience finds its
explanation and aChievement.43

In the multiple relations thus

constituted, the formation and progress of our personality becomes
possible.44
Our ego also constructs eternal life for itso1f, according
to Lavelle's doctrine, and this implies our union with pure being •
•

This union, in turn, consists in an operation which founds our
personality instead of
lated.45

pe~itting

In Lavelle's own words:

41Aote,

p.

141.

42~.

it to dissolve or be annihi"All our spiritual life is

(Translation mine.)

(Transla tion
43Puissance8, p. 15.

mine.)

44Lou18 Lavelle, "La tonotion de la pens'e," [Unpublished
writings ot Lavelle published posthumously], Giomale di Metatisioa, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952), 399.
-----45Etre, p.

49.
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contained in the formation of our personality, which is possible
only by the conquest and use of our liberty.

It is impossible

to separate the idea that we have of ourselves from the action
of our liberty.

It 1s by means of liberty that the ego disengages

itself from nature and fatality, and that it becomes an original
source of being and lite in the world, that it succeeds in making
its actions its own and justifying them.,,4 6
Only a failure to realize that we become persons not by
keeping within individual limits but only by surpassing them, can
account tor the refusal to allow that God is a person.

For Louis

Lavelle as for any genuine philosopher of person, God is the
foundation of our personal being.

Indeed, Lavelle has written

that it is his absolute relation with God which gives to each
individual, nwhatever be his Itmits or weaknesses, the mark ot
the absolute, that is to say, which m~es a saint of him.ft~1
Thus the influence of both existentialism and personalism can easily be traced in Lavelle's philosophy.

The existen-

tialist's concern with the concrete, living person who must
4 6Puissanees, P. 163: "Toute notre vie spirituelle reside
dans 1a tormatIon de notre personnalite qui n'eat possible que
par 1& eonqu3te et l'usage de notre 1iberte. Il. eat impossible
de separer l'idee que nous ayoos de nous-memes de ltaetion de
notre liberte. C'eat avec 1a libert' que 1e moi ae degage de la
nature at de 1a fatalite, qu'il devient dans 1e monde une source
originale d t 3tre et de vie, qu'll reuBsit a faire siennes ses
propres actions at a les justifIer." (Translation mine.)
41Quatre Sa1nts (Paris, 1951), p.

35.

(Translation m1ne.)
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commit llimself to being and

~eality

can be Been in Lavelle's

notion of man as a being who must use the existence he has to
shape his

pe~sonal

dom, whose sole

essence.

pu~pose

This is done by means of human

is the

pe~fection

f~ee

of the individual

subject who exercises it.

Personalists too consider the human

pe~son

and

as

self-dete~mining

f~ee,

but they emphasize man's

orientation to society and other persona.

Strains of this can

also be seen in Lavelle where he gives special prominence to the
question of human communication and

t~iendship.

Lavelle does not

view freedom as something merely personal but rather as something
which Is necessarily directed to other persons.

For him an

encounter with other freedoms Is imperative it I am to bring my
personal freedom to a fuller actualization.
In revealing its intrinsic dependence on personalist and
existentialist doctrines, Lavelle's thought can at the
be shown to be a highly
each of these.

pe~80nal

sam~

time

synthesis and development of

He llas taken various aspects of these doctrines

and woven them into a metaphysical doctrine of being based on
human oonsciousness and freedom.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONSCLUSION
The present century of unbelievable scientific advances has
also witnessed a new interest in man.

flWhat is meant by

'person'?" 1s a question that many scholars have tried to answer.
The empirical science of psychology has not been alone in this
quest, but modern philosophy as well has taken up the new, revitalized interest in mants nature.

This is most clearly seen,

perhaps, in the concern with the "personal" element of our
concrete, immediate, daily exper1.ences which is so characteristic
of eXistentialism, phenomenology, and personalism.
The aim of the present thesis was to study the thought of a
modern philosopher, Louis Lavelle, e~pecially from the po~t of
view of his philosophical theory of person and personality.

To

do tIds, we had first to get an understanding of the philosophical
climate in which he wrote, and a grasp of his general doctrine.
Then, brief attention was given to some of the prominent current
theories of person and personality in order to provide a context
1n which to situate Lavelle's position.

Now we can look back to

glance over our steps and review the results.
Like the philosophy of any individual, Lavelle's thought
derives partly from a philosophical heritage, partly from his own

oreative refleotion.

Platonism, existentialism, the philosophy of

spirit, and personalism are the roajor souroes from which Lavelle's
doctrine flows.

But the \mion of these various approa.ches to

reality within a single philosophical synthesis is solely the work
of the man.

To him helongs the credit for a masterful attempt

at oombining the need and value of metaphysics, the importance of
spiritual reality, personal

autono~,

and participation in God's

transcendenoe into one vital body of thought.

Almost in reaotion

to the grow1.ng tendenoy of compartmentalizing our knowledge and
interests, Lavelle has essayed a unified body of thought which
includes the oentral and most importallt themes of human thought.
Lavello's philosophy, however, is not entirely tree from
difficulties.

And since the philosopher with whom we are dealing

is primarily a metaphysician, it is not surprising that our
d.ifficulties arise f"rom an attempt tQ Justify hit! ontologioal
system.
Briefly stated, our principal objection to Lavellels metaphysics is that he fails to distinguish between act as existence
(first act) and act as operation (second act).

Lavelle makes a

three-fold distinction of being into Pure Aot (pure intimacy),
participated aot (union of passivity and activity), and pure
passivity (pure exteriority, the given).

In a partioipated being

Lavelle reduces first act to second aot.

This reduotion causes

no problem 1f we are considering Pure Aot, in which there is no
distinction between existence and operation.

But when we consider

participated being--a human person, for example--we meet an insoluble difficulty.

Pure Act is distinguished from a finite being

by the latterts act of participation.

As a partioipating belng,

my act is formed of both activity and passivity.

But it asked

what in me is passive and what active, Lavelle's systenl seems
unable to fu:r-nish a.n adequate response.

Nowhere can we find an

explanation of what gives to the partioipating aot the indivlduality by which it is ontologically distinguished from Pure Act.
Lavelle has failed to make

Ii

close stUdy or analysis of the form

of finito being, or contingent act.

This ambiguity makes the

suspicions of pantheiMs which have been oast upon Lavelle's
dootrine more easily understandable.
Acoording to at least one author, this problem would not
have arisen in Lavelle's philosoph, if he had not based his
ontology on the :r-ejection of the real composition between substance and accidents in finite beings.''i

Fearing that this dis-

tinction would lead irrevocably to the Kantlan distination
between the noumenon and phenomenon, 1n whiah all being would be
merely an unknown substrate for phenomenal changes of the real,
Lavelle ooncluded that the distinction between SUbstance and
accidents was only the projection on the real of our manner of

IBechara Bargi, La Rartlcipatlon ! l'etre dans l ! Ehilosophie
1957), p. 150.

~ Louis Lavelle (ParIS,

64
':)

thinking. ,In Lavalle!s philosophy the initial experience of being
es tablishes us iI!l!l1ediately in a dua.lism of ego (consciousness)

and being.

This dualism, however. is different from the tl"adl-

tiona.l dualism which places a reciprocal rel.ation between the

subject and object.

i.,avelle t s is a. dualism

o:.~

intimacy in which

t.h.e ago is separated fro:n being only by its self-affirmation in
the expression of its very intimacy with baing.
affirrt1a. tiOll in the human person is the

VfH'Y

This self-

cora of his freedom,

and by means of participated acta of freedom wa find it possible,
in th.e Lavellian scheme, to create ourselves and to pa.rticipate
more and more fully in the :fullnHss of being.

It would not be

too great an exaggeration to consider Lavelle's whole philosophy
as a desoription of the oreation of the self by the sel.f.
We have seen that in the Lavelll!inJJletaphysic, being

~s

an

act, an act in which we both realize our own being and construct
our proper selves th.rough free choices.

In this way we at-ClUBe

OU1~-

selves to conform more and more closely to the ideal imar,e of the
human being, and thus to acquire a deeper penetration of and
partioipation in the Trrulscendent Pure Act, God.

2Thus it dOGS not seem quite aocurate to say, as Professor
Collins does in his artiole on Lavelle (Philosoph1cal Rev1ew, LVI
[1941], p. 165) that Lavelle's "created oreation" or self-formation in freedom is the same as Scholast1c secondary causality.
Human creativ1ty truly partakes of the oharaoter of our mode of
be1ng. But Scholastics and Lavelle differ in the1r metaphysical
explanation of the human person.

J"'rom -chis achelll8 of things the extreme value of the human

agent can t'eadily btl seen, and hare enters the underlying concepts
of person a11<l personality.

By his llature man is capable of

lnaking free cllOices which sinrul tane()usly cause him to realize and
constitute

hl~selr

in being, as well as to Cillne into closor
Freedom and tht3 ahill ty to

cOl"!1nr.mication with the ;)1 vine Be1n.::;*

oake c":":1.010e8, plu3

~1.is

limited part:i.cipRT;iol1 in the divIno

essence, constitute l!'\an's

di~~:nii;y:

they make him a per::.on.

The

actual use Made of this ability, anu tho sort of boing which
consequently results is ';vila t Lavelle means by per-sonali ty.

V{hlle

use of thes8 terms in this sellse is peculiar to ....avella's philosopt-JoY. they do serve to point (Jut the original and synthetic

c}larac ter" of hi s thought.
In the beginr.l.il1g of Chapter

4 we

observed that the Idea of

peI'son evolved fI'om an emphasis on th~ human subl:$ tanoe (dul.:ing

the .Middle Ages) into the strongly psychological notion of a selfconscious being (f'rolll Desoartes' time until the present.)

Uow,

Just as Lavelle's metaphysic;l!.r.l thought is a synthesis of ElBSen-

tlalist and existelltialist doot!'ines of being, so in the area of
philosoprlY of person does his thought represent a union between

the "'self ... contained" notion of person and the notion of per30n as
a "substance".

Th.e indiVIdual person, Lavelle would vigorously

assert, is a substa.nce-and thls in known fran the Ini t~_al fact
of unified consciousness Wllich each person experiences 1n himself.

:11:

, I
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But this human 8ubsta.nce only becomes a person by exercising
l'I.imsel f in a subjective series of choices throup-.h which he umakes
himself!! according to the pattern of an ideal human essence.
enters the important concept of freedom.

Only by means of

Here

my

freedom am I able to perform consciou.s and responsible human
actIons.

Thus, and only thus, do I merit the dignity of being a

human person.

By my oommitments and strivings towards this goal.

I more and more realize the

~111nes8

of my participated nature in

the One Transcendent Free Being, God, the source of all being.
Precisely here, in the special emphasis which he gives to
human freedom, does Lavelle effect a union between the traditional
philosophical truths of past centuries and the most deeply felt
needs of modern man.

Traditional Christian thought has always

defend.ed man t s moral autonomy with firm philosophical princ iples.
While materialism and scientific progI!eS8 have largely caused hIm
to lose sight of these firm prIncIples,"modern man Is nevertheless
keenly interested today in the psychological tact of his own freedom.

By his philosophical synthesis Lavelle has united these

two elements of yesterday and today.

Througn his attention to

consciousness and the necessary Qutonomy ot human volitional
activity, La,,'elle has explained the existential fact that men
are free beings.
ultimates:

But his explanation i8 in terms of philosophical

being, act, participation, and cause.l! ty.

The fact

that he gives a metaphysical foundation to current psychological
and existential themes seems to be the principal advantage which

67
reoommends Lavelle's philosophy to modern thinkers.
In asserting that essence precedes

exlst~nce.

Lavelle had no

other end In view than to maintain the reality of liberty, or
freedom, against the determinist philosophies which are so prevalent in the philosopllical world of today_

These philosophies

enclose us in an immutable nature which we are unable to chanr,e in
spite of our very best efforts.

As if to answer this sort of

philosophizing, Lavelle sometimes equates existence with liberty,
as when he says:

"existence oannot be defined otherwise than as

liberty,") and "when treating of a tree being, that which we call
his existence • • • is his treedom."4
The philosophical world has much to learn from the intriguing
writings or the modern French metaphysician whose doctrine we have
been studying.

It i. to be earnestly hoped that more thinkers wil

turn their attention to his ideas, though they need not agree with
everything he has written.

The most stimulating thinkers in

history have been men who have held to certain capital principles,
and then tried to run a middle course between extremist positions.
Lavelle may not have succeeded perfectly; indeed, no man doesJ
But we should be grateful to him for holding firmly to our highest

)Louis Lavelle, Introduction i l'ontologie (Paris, 1947),
p. 34: "[L]fexistence ne peut itre d4rinie autrement que comme
une liberte." (Translation mine.)

4Act!, p. 96: "[Q]uand il s'agit d'un etre libre, ce que nou
appelons son existence • • • c'est sa liberte."
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Christian traditions, and then resolutely striking out on a path
which would enable man to see that the natural and the supernatural, the old and the modern are not incompatible.

Everything

participates in the All, the Supreme Person wi/hose supremely
perfect persona11tv:. is our lifets task to imita.te.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.

PRIMARY SOURCES
A. BOOKS

Lavelle, Louis. De ltacte. (Collection "Philosophie de llEsprIt"). EdItIons Montaigne, Paris, 1937.
-----. De l'4me humaine. (Collection "Philosophie de ltEspr!ttl).
Edit10ns lontaigne, Paris, 1951.
-----. De lt3tre. Nouvelle edition, entierement retondue at
preCld&e d'une "Introduction a la Dialectique de l'Eternal
Present," (Colleetion "Philosoph!e de ItEsprit"). Editions
Montaigne, Paris, 1947 •

.....- . !21! t!WVS ti
ltEaprit

•

.!!!. l'eternite.
(Collection "Philosoph!e de
Editions Montaigne, Paris, 1945.

a

-----. Introduction
l'ontologie. (Nouvelle Encyclopedia
Ph11osophlque). -Presses Unlversitaires de Franee, Paris,

1941.

--.---.

oonscience de 80i. Grasset'. Paris, 1933.
-LaLe mal
-la souttranc!. (Collection "Presences").

--.. -.~
~
ParIi,194o. -

-------.
--.. --.

PIon,

EdItions Montaigne, Paris, 1936.
~

parole de l'ecriture.

LtArtisan du Livre, Paris, 1942.

-----. ~ ph~losophie tranoaise entre
Montaigne, 'aris, 1942.

!!a ~

guerres.

Ed!tions

-----. La prjsence totale. (Collection "Philosoph!e de l'EspritT). Ed!t!ons Monta!gne, Paris, 1934.

____ e.

~ ~UlaSanCe. ~ mol.
(Biblioth4que de Phllosophie
scienti ique', Frammarion, Paris, 1948.

10
- ... _--.

Qun.tre saints.

Editions Albin Michel, Parls, 1951.

-----. Tralte des valeurs. (Collection r1Logos") • -rome I,
Presses Un1versitalres de France, ParIs, 1951.
B.

ARTICLES

Lavelle, Louis. "Analyse de l'etre et dissociation de l'essence
st de l'existence," Revue ~ Metaphysigue ~ ~ Morale, LII

(1947), 201-227.

-----. "Donner at reoevolr," (UnpublIshed writings of Louis
Lavelle published posthumously). Giornale a!. Metafisica,
VII (4) (Lug11o-Agosto 1952), 400-404.
-----. "Etre et acte," Revue ~ Metaphysigue !1 £! Morale, XLIII
(1936), 187-210.
-----. "L'experienoe psycholog1que du temps," Revue ~ Metaphysique !! ~ Morale, XLVIII (1941), 81-9b.
-----. "La 1'onotion de la penaes.· (Unpublished writings of
Louls Lavelle published posthumousl1). Giorna1e dl Meta1'ls1ca, VII (4) (Lug11o-Agosto 1952), 397-399.
------

-----. "La metaphyslque ou 1a science de l'intlmite spirituelle,"
Revue internationals de PhllosoPhie, II (Octobre 15, 1939),

43-65.

-----.

-"

"

"Notes sur 1e sujet: pourquol y a-t-i1 un monde?,"
S! Metatisioa, X (3) (Maggio-Giugno 1955), 384-386.

Ct1o~na1e

-----. "Preface," L'etSistance de !2.!ru! par Miohele-.t<'. Soiacoa,
(Traduction de R4g1s Jolivet), Edit10ns Monta1gne, Par1s,

1951.

-----. "Sur la notion d'exlstence," (inedlt). Les itudes Phi1oloph1gu,!, XIII (1) (Janvier-Mars 1958), 3:14.
-----. "Temo~g.," Les .tud•• Philosoprugues, VI (2) (Avril.
SeptembreA. 1951) ,12'8-134.

____ e.

"Th. Three Stages of Metaphys10a," 1n Phil0sofhlC Thought
1n France and the United State!, Marvin FarSer, ed.),
UDlverait7-o?!U1falo ~resa, buffalo, New York, 1950, translator uzmamed.

I'

71
-----. "Une solitude ouverte sur tout l'univers," Archivio Dl
Ph11oaophia-li Solipslamo, 19.51, 9-18.
........................... II.

SECOHDARY SOURCES
A.

Allport, Gordon W. !h.!!. Nature
aohuaetts, 1950.
-----.

Personalltz_

BOOKS

.2!. Personality. Cambridge,

~~asa

Henry Holt Co., New York, 1937.

Arnold, Magda B. and Gasson, John A., S.J.
Ronald Press, New York, 1954.

_ . . .=---_. .

The Human Persan.

Brehier, imile. Trap!formation de la phIlosophic franqalse.
(Blbllotheque
PhlIo80phie-sC1entlrlque), FIammarIon,
Paris, 1950.

ae

Bochensk!, I. M. La ihll080phie contemporaine en europe. Traduit
d'apr's la deuxleme 'dition par Pran90Ia Vaudou. Paris, 195L
English translation, Contemporary European PhilosophZ, translated trom the German by Donald Nicholl and Karl Asohenbrenner, Berkeley, CalIfornia, 1956.
Collins, Jamea D.

~

Existentialist..

Copleston, Frederick, S.J.
19.56.

Chicago, 1952.

"

Contemporary Phl1opophZ.

Cresson, Andr'. ~ Phl1osophi. tranialae.
de Franoe, Paris, 1951.
Daval, Roger. Hl,;oire des ide,s en trano ••
alta1res de
ance,-paris, 1956.

London,

Presses Univers1taires
Presses Un1ver-

Dumery, Hem:.:y.

Regards!.l!t la philoso;eh1e oon temporalne.
xi.me ed1tion, Paris, 19>7.

Deu-

Eoole, Jean. La m;ta~lsi9ue ~ l'ltre dans l! ~l~osophie ~
Lou!s Laverle.
losophes ContemporaIns,
I ions Rauwelaerts, Paris, 1957.
Ferm, Vergllius, ed.
York, 1950.

! History 2! PhIlosophical Szstems.

New

72
Ii'oulquie. Pc.ul.

L' axis tcntiialisl:lo.

l'rasses Uni ve:'s i taires de

Franoe, Paris, 1951. Engllan translation, Existentialism,
from the first French edit1::m, 1947, by Kathleen Raines,
London, 1948.
Gratton, Henri, O.F.ll.
Parls, 1955.

Psychanalyses

d'hle~ ~

d'aujourd'hul.

~~ounier,

E:rmnanual. Porsonalism. (Tran'3!ated from the French
Phl1ip Mairet.) The drove Press, New York, 1952.

-----.

~I

est-oe que Ie personnalisme?

Du Sauil, PaPis,

1~6.

Nichol, Dor.1a1d. Recent Thought
York, 1952.

!B

~'ocus.

(Colleotions EsprIt),
Sheed and Ward, Hew

Sargi, Beohara. ~ partioipation ! 1tetre,~
Louis Livelle. Beauohesne, Paris, 1951.
Smith, Vincent Edward.
True,

Gon~agu,.

~

Idea-Men g! TOdaz.

by

~

philosoph!e

~

Milwaukee, 1950.

J.-P. Sartr! a ~ Lavelle ~ desagr&gation
Editions ~i&8ot, Paris, 1946.

!! re1ntesration.

VanderVeldt, James H•• O.P.M. and Odenwald, Robert P.
!US Cathq1ioism. MoGraw-Hill, New York, 1952.
B.

Psyohiatry

ARTICLES"

Angou1.vent, F.-J. "N&orologie,ll Revue Phi10sGhigue de la Franoe
!! At 1 t :!tranger, LXXVI (195~) (.fanvler- 1"& 1952},-r60.
Aubier, Fernand. ffTemolbage." 010rnale U Metafislca, X (3)
(Magglo-Glugno 19550, 387-389.
Balthasar, H. J.
G~o:cnale

Ii o.

"r"funlvoclte non Immanente de lfetre total,tf
(4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952), 422-

S1 Metafisica, VII

Berger, Gaston. "Lou1s Lavelle," Les :Qtudes Philosophigues, VI
(Avri1-Septembre 1951), 123-1277
Baruzl, Jea.n. "Louis Lavelle," Les itudes Philosophigues, VI
(Avril-Septembre 1951), 138-140.

13
IILe temps at la participation dana l'oeuvre de Louis
Lavelle," Giornale ell Metaf'lsloa, VIr (4) (Luglio-Apos to
1952), 451-460.

-----.

Chaix Ruy, V. J.

B!!!. i!!

"L'experience ontique de Louis Lavolle,1I g,or(Luglio-Agosto 1952), 41)1- 1.

Metafisic~, VII U~)

Ohevaller, Irenee, O.P. "Aper9u sur 1& phI1osophie de M..
Lave11e,tI Revue Thomiste, XLV (Julllet-Septembre 1939),
509-533.
Col11ns, James D. "f,ouis Lavelle on Human ParticipatIon," .IW!.
Philosophical Review, LVI (1941), 156-183.
Davy, Georges. "Louis Lavelle,1I Les 1Btudes Phi10So higues, XII
(4) (Octobre-Decambre 1951), 319-326 and XIII 1) (JanvierMars 1958), 1S-3l.

1

Deltgaauw, SernaI'd. nEtre et acte chez Louis Lavelle," Glornale
g!, Meta!'isic,a. VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 19.52), 412-41[3.
D. Waelhena, Alphonse. "Una philosophie de la participation:
l'actualisme de M. Louis Lavelle," Revue Neosckolastigue de
Philo80Eh~!, LXII (1939), 213-229.
-Diogene. "Louis Lavelle, uomini letti," 0101"nale 9.!. Metafisica,
XII (6) (Novembre-Decembre 19.57), 135-752.
Ecole, Jean. "Cheminements et perspectives de la metaphyaique
lavellienne de 1'3tre .. " Les I1:tudes Philosophigues, XII (4)
(Octobre-Decembre 19S1),~7.334.
-----. ~existantia1isme de Louis Lavelle," Revue
(2) (1952), 378-402.

r~omiste,

LII

-----. nL'experience de l'etre et le point de depart de la metaphysique selon Louis Lavelle," L,s Ittudes Philosophlgues,
VIII (19.53), 312-383.
-----. "Le probleme du mal et le sans de l'existenoe huma1ne dans
la philosoph1e de L. Lavelle," Revu! Thomiate, LVII (1)
(1953), 109-129.
-----.

"Louis Lavelle et sa philosoph1e," Revue Thomiste, LII (1)

(1952), 149-159.

Forest, .lime. "La philosophie de l'e.prit," G10rnale di Metaris1oa. I (4) (Luglio 1946), 283-299.
------

ii:

14
HL<lvel:"'6 at l'1alel:n·t111Cho," Les
(1) (Janvier-Mars 1958), 32-4b.

-----.

~tudesL)hilosophigues,

XIII

G&rard, Jacques. "Acta et participation (A propos du dernier
ouvrage de M. Louis Lavelle)," Revue internationals de
philosophie, I (Octobro 15, 1938), i78-18~.
-GIlson, Etienne. "Christian Personalism," The Spirit 2! Medieval
.::Jhilosophy,
.
l'ew York, 1940, pp. 1B(j-20g:.
Jolivat, Regis. "L Tlm"llortallte de l'ame drapres Louis Lavelle,"
Lumie1"e !1 ~J 1955 (24), 79-100.
Lacroix, Jewl. "Consentement et creation," Las ~tudes Philo8ophig:U6S, XII (4) (Octobre-Deoembre 1957), 335-339.

----we

nUn philosophe du oonsantement,[Louis Lavelle]," Lumiere
at Vie, VII (1952), 105-121. Translated by Dom. Illtyd
Tret'hOwan, "LI. Philosopher of Acceptance: Louis Lavelle,1t
Downside Review, LXXI (1953>, 372-386.

Le Senne, Renee. "LouIs Laveller'tl Oiornale di Metafisioa, VII (4)
(Luglio-Agosto 1952), 405-421.
Loza, Raymond. "Climat et Methode de la philosophio de Lavelle,"
Melanges M ~tc.ience Religeuse, XI (19.54>, 203-214.
-----. "L'experience primitive de ~ouis Lavelle," Revue 'l'homist~,
LVI (1956), 2 7 1 - 2 8 0 . ·
•
-----.

"La liberte selon Lavelle," Revue Thomiste, LVIII (1958),

76-87.

Paule, Levert. "Le problema de l'objet dans 1& philosophie de
Louis Lavelle," Les J!:tudas PhilosoRhigues, XIII (1) (JanvierMars 1958), 47-5~
Pucel1e, Jean. "L'agi:- et Ie patir," Les ~tudes Philosophigu6S,
XII (4) (Octobre-Deoembre 1957), 340-3>2.
Reymond, Arnold. "Louis Lavelle et 1& phllosophie de 1& spir1.
tualite," Oio1"n&lo .!!! Metat1sica, VII (4) (Lug11o-Agoato

1952),

479-485.

Rice, Philip Blair. "Children ot Narcissus: Some Themes of
French Speculation," Kenyon Revi!w, XII (Winter 1950),

116-137.

--

APPROVAL

The thesis submi tted by

SHEET

ThOl1las Edward Gafney, S.J.,

has been raad and approved by three members of the Department

0

Philosophy.
The
thesis

final
and the

copies have

been

examined by the

director of th

signature which appears below verifies

that any necessary changes have been incorporated,
thesis
form,

is now given final

approval wi th

thesis

is therefore

fact

and that

reference to

and mechanical accuracy.

The

the

the

content

"

accepted in partial fulfillment

the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Signature of Adviser

(Substitute)

of

